Advisory

GHSA-wpcj-rmv4-86qg

Details, part 3 of 3. The advisory

Details

Option 3: Drop root privileges in the Dashboard container

Run the Dashboard process as a non-root user to reduce the impact of container-level arbitrary file writes.

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Remediation

Add a path boundary check in writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile after constructing sourceFilePath:

// pkg/processor/build/builder.go — fix for writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile
sourceFilePath := path.Join(tempDir, moduleFileName)

// Verify resolved path is within tempDir
absPath, err := filepath.Abs(sourceFilePath)
if err != nil {
    return "", errors.Wrap(err, "Failed to resolve absolute path")
}
absTempDir, err := filepath.Abs(tempDir)
if err != nil {
    return "", errors.Wrap(err, "Failed to resolve absolute tempDir")
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(absPath, absTempDir+string(os.PathSeparator)) {
    return "", errors.Errorf(
        "handler module path escapes build directory: %s", moduleFileName)
}

b.logger.DebugWith("Writing function source code to temporary file", "functionPath", absPath)
if err := os.WriteFile(absPath, decodedFunctionSourceCode, os.FileMode(0644)); err != nil {

Alternatively, reject any handler module name containing path separator characters before the build pipeline is invoked (at API request validation time).

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Resources

  • Vulnerable file: pkg/processor/build/builder.go — function writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile, line 654
  • Parser: pkg/functionconfig/handler.go — function ParseHandler, line 25
  • Go path.Join behavior: https://pkg.go.dev/path#Join
  • CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
  • OWASP Path Traversal: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal

Sources & licences