Advisory
GHSA-wpp4-vqfq-v4hp
Also known as: CVE-2025-62594
Summary
ImageMagick CLAHE : Unsigned underflow and division-by-zero lead to OOB pointer arithmetic and process crash (DoS)
Details
Summary
A single root cause in the CLAHE implementation — tile width/height becoming zero — produces two distinct but related unsafe behaviors.
Vulnerabilities exists in the CLAHEImage() function of ImageMagick’s MagickCore/enhance.c.
- Unsigned integer underflow → out-of-bounds pointer arithmetic (OOB): when
tile_info.height == 0, the expressiontile_info.height - 1(unsigned) wraps to a very large value; using that value in pointer arithmetic yields a huge offset and OOB memory access (leading to memory corruption, SIGSEGV, or resource exhaustion). - Division/modulus by zero: where code performs
... / tile_info.widthor... % tile_info.heightwithout re-checking for zero, causing immediate division-by-zero crashes under sanitizers orabortat runtime.
Both behaviors are triggered by the same invalid tile condition (e.g., CLI exact -clahe 0x0! or automatic tile derivation dim >> 3 == 0 for very small images).
---
Details
Unsigned underflow(can lea to OOB)
- Location:
MagickCore/enhance.c, around line 609 - Version tested: 7.1.2-8 (local ASan(undefined). /UBSan build)
- Vulnerable code
enhance.c: 609
```c
p += (ptrdiff_t) clahe_info->width * (tile.height - 1);
```
- Root Cause - If
tile.height == 0, then(tile.height - 1)underflows toUINT_MAX. - Multiplication withclahe_info->widthyields a huge value close toSIZE_MAX. - Adding this topcauses pointer arithmetic underflow.
Division-by-zero
- File / Location:
MagickCore/enhance.c, around line 669 - Version tested: 7.1.2-8 (local ASan(undefined). /UBSan build)
- vulnerable code
enhance.c: 669-673
```c
if ((image->columns % tile_info.width) != 0)
tile_info.x=(ssize_t) (tile_info.width-(image->columns % tile_info.width));
tile_info.y=0;
if ((image->rows % tile_info.height) != 0)
tile_info.y=(ssize_t) (tile_info.height-(image->rows % tile_info.height));
```
- Root cause
Missing input validation / bounds checks after computing default tile dimensions:
If either tile_info.width or tile_info.height is 0, this triggers a division by zero. Zeros can reach this point through:
1. Exact tiles: CLI clahe 0x0! (the ! forces zero to be used verbatim).
2. Auto tiles on tiny images: When a requested tile is 0 (no !), the code derives a default from the image size (e.g., dim >> 3). For images with dim < 8, this result is 0 unless clamped.
---
Reproduction
Unsigned underflow
Environment
Built with AddressSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer enabled.
export UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1
export ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:allocator_may_return_null=1:detect_leaks=0
Command
./magick xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:
Output
MagickCore/enhance.c:609:6: runtime error: addition of unsigned offset overflowed
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior MagickCore/enhance.c:609:6 in CLAHEImage
./magick -size 10x10 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:
<img width="1068" height="64" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cd9637ee-1d03-4066-834d-fda22410dd8b" />
memory region corruption.
./magick -size 2000x2000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:
<img width="1069" height="70" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ecbab79c-a3c2-4e8c-96c9-8e2aa8f0d2b2" />
→ Significant memory consumption and evidence of memory region corruption.
./magick -size 4000x4000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:
<img width="776" height="49" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/63a7cec5-616b-4aa5-87f3-a546a87e6625" />
→ Much larger memory usage; process appears to be aggressively consuming cache and address space.
./magick -size 8000x8000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:
<img width="748" height="46" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/48b3aac8-98b3-4fbb-a5ca-4e7936bca44b" />
→ Memory usage escalates further and begins exhausting available cache. If left running, the process is likely to crash (DoS) after sustained allocation attempts.
Division-by-zero
Environment: ASan/UBSan-enabled build.
export UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1
export ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:allocator_may_return_null=1:detect_leaks=0
Command
./magick -size 16x2 gradient: -type TrueColor -depth 8 -clahe 0x0! null:
Output
<img width="1915" height="818" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cfe44432-b429-49e4-8673-2ed55ba9a961" />
Notes: Without sanitizers, the process may terminate with just Aborted (still DoS).
---
Impact
- Primary: Denial-of-Service — crash or sustained resource exhaustion (memory/cache thrash) when processing crafted parameters or small images via CLI or API. Attackers can trivially trigger via
clahe 0x0!or by uploading very small images to services using ImageMagick. - Secondary (theoretical): OOB memory accesses and memory corruption could potentially be combined with other vulnerabilities to achieve more severe outcomes; however, no reliable code execution was demonstrated from these PoCs alone.
---
Suggested concrete patch snippets
Apply in CLAHEImage() after tile_info is computed but before any division/modulus/pointer arithmetic:
if (exact_tiles_requested && (tile_info.width == 0 || tile_info.height == 0)) {
ThrowMagickException(exception, GetMagickModule(), OptionError,
"CLAHEInvalidTile", "%lux%lu",
(unsigned long) tile_info.width,
(unsigned long) tile_info.height);
return (Image *) NULL;
}
if (!exact_tiles_requested) {
tile_info.width = (tile_info.width == 0) ? MagickMax((size_t)1, image->columns >> 3) : tile_info.width;
tile_info.height = (tile_info.height == 0) ? MagickMax((size_t)1, image->rows >> 3) : tile_info.height;
}
if (tile_info.width == 0 || tile_info.height == 0) {
ThrowMagickException(exception, GetMagickModule(), OptionError,
"CLAHEInvalidTile", "%lux%lu",
(unsigned long) tile_info.width,
(unsigned long) tile_info.height);
return (Image *) NULL;
}
ssize_t tile_h_minus1 = (ssize_t)tile_info.height - 1;
if (tile_h_minus1 < 0) {
ThrowMagickException(exception, GetMagickModule(), OptionError,
"CLAHEInvalidTile", "%lux%lu",
(unsigned long) tile_info.width,
(unsigned long) tile_info.height);
return (Image *) NULL;
}
p += (ptrdiff_t) clahe_info->width * tile_h_minus1;
Notes about exact_tiles_requested: if the CLI/Wand parser already exposes whether ! was present, use it. If not, add a parse-time flag so CLAHEImage can know whether 0 is literal or auto.
---
Credit
Team Whys
Bug Hunting Master Program, HSpace/Findthegap
Severity
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
Dates
- Published
- 2025-10-27 23:33 UTC
- Modified
- 2026-09-10 03:50 UTC
Affected packages and fixes
| Package | Fix |
|---|---|
| Magick.NET-Q16-x64 | No fixed version is listed. |
| Magick.NET-Q8-x64 | No fixed version is listed. |
| Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64 | No fixed version is listed. |
| Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64 | No fixed version is listed. |
| Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64 | No fixed version is listed. |
| Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64 | No fixed version is listed. |
| Magick.NET-Q8-arm64 | No fixed version is listed. |
| Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 | No fixed version is listed. |
| Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64 | No fixed version is listed. |
| Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64 | No fixed version is listed. |
| Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64 | No fixed version is listed. |
| Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64 | No fixed version is listed. |
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Links
Source
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0