Advisory

GHSA-ww9q-8r59-xv46

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

The circuit-level fix replaces the first-iteration assign_advice() calls for the base point with copy_advice(), introducing a copy constraint that requires the first base value to equal the correct base. Combined with the existing q_mul_2 equality constraint across the loop, this transitively constrains every base value in the incomplete-addition stage to the correct base, closing the freedom the attacker relied on.

Because remediating a zero-knowledge circuit changes the pinned verifying key, the network-level fix required a hard fork (NU6.2). NU6.2 re-enables Orchard with the corrected circuit and routes Orchard proofs to a per-circuit verifying key (InsecurePreNu6_2 / FixedPostNu6_2).

  • halo2_gadgets 0.5.0
  • orchard 0.14.0
  • zcash_primitives 0.28.0
  • zebrad 5.0.0 (NU6.2); 4.5.3 ships the interim soft-fork mitigation
  • zcashd 6.20.0 (NU6.2)

Workarounds / mitigations

There is no client-side workaround for the underlying soundness flaw short of the circuit fix. The deployed interim mitigation (Zebra 4.5.3 / equivalent) was a soft fork that rejected all Orchard-containing transactions and blocks, fully neutralizing exploitation until NU6.2 activated.

Downstream projects that depend on the affected crates should:

  • Upgrade halo2_gadgets, orchard, and zcash_primitives to the patched versions above.
  • Audit any other use of assign_advice() (and similar non-constraining assignment APIs) where the intended invariant is that a witnessed value equals a known/fixed value; such sites should use copy_advice() (or otherwise enforce an explicit constraint).

Indicators / detection

Exploitation produces no distinguishing on-chain signature. The turnstile mechanism, which tracks total ZEC across all value pools, provides a ground-truth supply check and confirmed the total supply remained intact. Heuristic analysis of Orchard transaction arity (e.g. patterns of duplicate-then-consolidate behavior) is possible but inconclusive against normal shielded-activity variance.

Timeline (MDT)

| Date / Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2022-05-31 11:50 | Vulnerable NU5 upgrade activates (bug introduced) |
| 2026-05-29 (evening) | Vulnerability discovered during a protocol audit |
| 2026-05-29 23:53 | Responsibly disclosed to ZODL core engineers |
| 2026-05-30 06:30 | Disclosure acknowledged by ZODL |
| 2026-06-01 (~21:30) | Emergency soft-fork mitigation activated (block 3,363,426) |
| 2026-06-03 00:05 EDT | NU6.2 hard fork activates, Orchard re-enabled with fix (block 3,364,600) |

Credits

Discovered and responsibly disclosed by Taylor Hornby, independent security researcher, during a protocol audit conducted on behalf of Shielded Labs. Analysis and remediation was led by ZODL engineers Jack Grigg, Daira-Emma Hopwood, and Kris Nuttycombe, with Zebra patch work by Arya Solhi (Zcash Foundation).

Resources

  • Zcash Foundation: *Zebra 4.5.3 and 5.0.0: Emergency Soft Fork and NU6.2 Activation* — https://zfnd.org/zebra-4-5-3-and-5-0-0-emergency-soft-fork-and-nu6-2-activation/
  • Affected source (pre-fix): halo2_gadgets/src/ecc/chip/mul/incomplete.rs @ commit 32a87582dfb0ad9364ef3ffe71751ceab2a502ea, L309–L310

Sources & licences