Advisory

GHSA-wwx6-x28x-8259

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

The equivalent wire-level attack shape is:

1. Connect to a russh server using the default compression advertisement.
2. Send SSH_MSG_KEXINIT with compression client-to-server preference:
   zlib,[email protected],none
3. Complete key exchange and send SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS.
4. Before any SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, send a compressed SSH_MSG_DEBUG packet:
   - compressed packet body: < 256 KiB
   - decompressed packet body: > 128 MiB
5. Vulnerable behavior: russh accepts and inflates the packet, then reaches the
   normal DEBUG ignore path.
6. Fixed behavior: russh rejects during decompression with Error::PacketSize.

The direct receive-path client/server regression tests are still useful because they isolate the bug precisely. They construct the post-decryption compressed packet body passed to maybe_decompress() and prove that the oversized packet is rejected before normal DEBUG ignore handling. The server-side pre-auth variant above is the one that justifies the highest CVSS framing for this bug.

The most important targeted checks are:

cargo test -p russh oversized_debug_payload_can_stay_below_wire_cap -- --nocapture
cargo test -p russh oversized_compressed_debug_is_rejected_before_client_ignores_it -- --nocapture
cargo test -p russh oversized_compressed_debug_is_rejected_before_server_ignores_it -- --nocapture

Before the fix, both the direct client and direct server receive-path oversized checks went red because the compressed payload was accepted and decompressed instead of being rejected at the post-decompression boundary. After the fix, they pass.

Impact

Suggested CVSS v3.1 for current maintained releases:

  • CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
  • Score: 7.5

Reasoning:

  • AV:N: reachable by a remote SSH peer
  • AC:L: straightforward once compression is enabled
  • PR:N, UI:N: no prior auth or user interaction required
  • C:N, I:N: confidentiality or integrity impact was not demonstrated
  • A:H: remote peer can cause oversized post-decompression packet processing and disconnect / denial of service

Affected versions:

  • historical stronger case: russh >= 0.34.0, < 0.58.0
  • current maintained remote DoS case: russh >= 0.58.0, including 0.60.3

Fix / Patch Direction

Add an explicit maximum decompressed SSH packet size and enforce it inside Decompress::decompress() before returning decompressed bytes to the client or server packet parser.

The intended ceiling is 128 MiB, matching OpenSSH portable's effective sshbuf hard maximum for post-decompression packet storage. The fix should reject decompression output larger than that bound with a packet-size error before normal message dispatch.

The fix should preserve normal compressed packet behavior below the cap, including DEBUG packets that are decompressed and then ignored through the existing normal path.

Patch branch:

fix/zlib-decompression-cap

Sources & licences