Details
Affected versions
All releases on the v3 branch (>= 3.0.0, <= 3.7.0); the silent-drop behavior has been present since the first v3 release. Only deployments using non-net/http integrations (coraza-spoa, coraza-proxy-wasm, custom FFI) are exposed in practice.
References
internal/corazawaf/transaction.golines 834–866 (ProcessURI error branch)internal/corazawaf/transaction.goline 822 (REQUEST_URI_RAWis populated before the parse, which is whyREQUEST_URI_RAW-targeted rules still catch the attack)- Commented-out fallback at lines 840–851 referencing
VARIABLE_URI_PARSE_ERROR - CWE-20 — Improper Input Validation
- CWE-436 — Interpretation Conflict
Severity (revised 2026-10-02)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N (4.0, Medium).
Attack Complexity stays High: the bypass only applies to integrations that pass Coraza a raw URI that Go's URL parser rejects, which net/http does not. The previous vector scored Integrity High (6.8); it is scored here like Coraza's other inspection bypasses.
Impact metrics follow the convention used across Coraza's WAF-bypass advisories: the vulnerable component is Coraza, but the impact lands on the protected application, so Scope is Changed. The bypass hides a payload from inspection; the application still has to be vulnerable to it, so Integrity is Low and Confidentiality is not scored separately.
_AI involvement in this section: Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic), via Claude Code, re-derived the CVSS vector from the project's triage guidance (AGENTS.md, "CVSS preconditions get verified, not copied from the report") and drafted this text. A human maintainer (fzipi) chose the S:C/I:L impact convention and directed this update._