Advisory

GHSA-x3cv-r3g3-fpg9

Also known as: CVE-2026-35402, PYSEC-2026-2626

Summary

Neo4j Labs MCP Servers: SSRF and Data Modification via read_only Mode Bypass Through CALL Procedures

Details

Summary
The read_only mode in mcp-neo4j-cypher versions prior to 0.6.0 can be bypassed using CALL procedures.
Details

Impact
The enforcing of read_only mode in vulnerable versions could be bypassed by certain APOC procedures.

Patches
v0.6.0 release hardened the checks around the mode. The only way to guarantee the server actions is to limit the permissions of the db credentials available to the server.

Notes
Impacts for server-side request forgery vulnerabilities may depend on both the configuration of the vulnerable system as well as the presence of other systems in the environment that could be accessed as part of exploitation.
Recommended hardening

  • Limit the apoc procedures to what's required
  • [Manage data loading privileges](https://neo4j.com/docs/operations-manual/current/authentication-authorization/load-privileges/ )
  • Don't relax the default settings without compensating controls - apoc.import.file.enabled is false by default - apoc.import.file.use_neo4j_config is true by default to restrict file imports to the import folder

Credits
We want to publicly recognise the contribution of Yotam Perkal from Pluto Security.

Severity

Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW

Dates

Published
2026-04-17 21:30 UTC
Modified
2026-07-13 16:43 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

mcp-neo4j-cypher

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.6.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

0.6.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.6.0
    pip install --upgrade mcp-neo4j-cypher==0.6.0

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences