gitea.com/gitea/runner
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.0.9-0.20260731160927-34bfa1915022(semver)
Fixed versions
1.0.9-0.20260731160927-34bfa1915022
Fix
- Fixed version
1.0.9-0.20260731160927-34bfa1915022go get gitea.com/gitea/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-73802, GO-2026-6656
gitea-runner: workflow container.options passes host namespaces and capability flags to job container when privileged mode is disabled
Summary
act_runner appends workflow-controlled jobs.<job>.container.options directly
to the Docker HostConfig for the job container. When runner privileged mode is
disabled, only Privileged is forced false. Host namespace flags, capability
expansion, and security profile overrides from workflow YAML are preserved in
the final HostConfig. A workflow author can enter host PID/IPC namespaces and
execute commands on the runner host as root.
Details
Source-to-sink path in act_runner:
ContainerSpec.Options accepts workflow YAML container.optionsRunContext.options() appends workflow options to runner-level container optionsPrivileged: rc.Config.Privileged but also with Options: rc.options(ctx)mergeContainerConfigs() parses Docker CLI-style options into HostConfigcopts.privileged is forced falsesanitizeConfig() only filters Binds and MountsPrivileged=false
PidMode=host
IpcMode=host
CapAdd=["ALL"]
SecurityOpt=["seccomp=unconfined","apparmor=unconfined"]
Attacker workflow YAML:
jobs:
breakout:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container:
image: ubuntu:22.04
options: >-
--pid=host --ipc=host --cap-add=ALL
--security-opt seccomp=unconfined
--security-opt apparmor=unconfined
steps:
- name: host namespace marker
run: |
nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- sh -c "id > /tmp/marker"
Impact
An attacker who can submit a workflow to a repository using a shared
Docker-backed act_runner can:
Critical severity for shared runners where untrusted users can trigger
workflows. High severity for single-tenant runners with privileged mode
explicitly disabled as a security control.
Fix Direction
Treat container.options as untrusted input. Reject or strip when
privileged mode is disabled:
--pid=host, --ipc=host, --uts=host, --network=host--cap-add ALL, --cap-add SYS_ADMIN--security-opt seccomp=unconfined, --security-opt apparmor=unconfined--device, --device-cgroup-rule--volumes-from--runtime, --cgroup-parentCritical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 1.0.9-0.20260731160927-34bfa1915022 (semver)1.0.9-0.20260731160927-34bfa1915022
1.0.9-0.20260731160927-34bfa1915022go get gitea.com/gitea/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0