Advisory

GHSA-x5mv-8wgw-29hg

Also known as: CVE-2026-55093, RUSTSEC-2026-0217

Summary

tract-nnef: integer overflow in NNEF .dat tensor parser yields an out-of-bounds read on model load

Details

  • Component: tract-nnef (nnef/src/tensors.rs::read_tensor) + tract-data (data/src/tensor.rs)
  • Affected versions: < 0.21.16, 0.22.0–0.22.2, 0.23.0–0.23.1 — the dense DatLoader path was unguarded across all three release lines; patched in 0.21.16 / 0.22.2 / 0.23.1
  • Class: CWE-190 (integer overflow) → CWE-125 (out-of-bounds read)
  • Trigger: loading a crafted NNEF model archive (*.nnef.tgz / *.nnef.tar / dir) via the public tract_nnef::nnef().model_for_path / model_for_read
  • Impact: read_tensor returns a memory-unsafe tensor (reported len 2^61 over a 56-byte heap allocation). Always-on primitive: a bounded heap out-of-bounds read during model build (as_uniform), an adjacent-heap information-disclosure reachable via the public load API. The resulting slice is an unsound from_raw_parts(ptr, 2^61) that SIGSEGVs (DoS) on any access past the mapped region (demonstrated by direct access). No out-of-bounds write and no RCE were achieved — tract's const-folding/as_uniform fast-paths fold simple consuming graphs without the full read.
  • Severity: Medium

Summary

read_tensor builds a tensor shape from attacker-controlled 32-bit dimensions and computes the element count len = product(shape) and the byte allocation product(shape) * size_of(dt) with unchecked `usize` arithmetic. In --release (no overflow-checks), both products wrap modulo 2^64. An attacker chooses dimensions so that the wrapped products collapse to a small value that satisfies the header consistency check, while the *true* element count remains astronomically large. read_tensor returns Ok with a Tensor whose reported len (e.g. 2^61+7) is far larger than its backing heap allocation (e.g. 56 bytes). The unchecked slice accessor as_slice_unchecked (from_raw_parts(ptr, self.len)) then produces a slice spanning ~18 exabytes over a 56-byte buffer. The out-of-bounds read fires automatically during model build (no inference required), reachable through the default DatLoader resource loader.

Root cause

nnef/src/tensors.rs, read_tensor:

let shape: TVec<usize> = header.dims[0..header.rank as usize].iter().map(|d| *d as _).collect();
let len = shape.iter().product::<usize>();                       // (1) unchecked, wraps
...
} else if header.bits_per_item != u32::MAX
    && len * (header.bits_per_item as usize / 8) != header.data_size_bytes as usize  // (2) wrapped == u32
{
    bail!(...);
}
...
let mut tensor = unsafe { Tensor::uninitialized_dt(dt, &shape)? };   // (3) alloc off the same wrapped product
...
reader.read_exact(plain.as_bytes_mut())?;                            // storage-bounded read, no overflow here
Ok(tensor)

data/src/tensor.rs, uninitialized_aligned_dt:

let bytes = shape.iter().cloned().product::<usize>() * dt.size_of();  // (3) wraps to the same small value
let storage = ... Blob::new_for_size_and_align(bytes, alignment) ...;
...
tensor.update_strides_and_len();                                     // len = product(shape), wraps, no clamp

The three quantities — the consistency-check LHS (2), the allocation (3), and the reported len — are all the same wrapped product(shape)*size_of, so they stay mutually consistent and the consistency check at `(2)` cannot catch the overflow. data_size_bytes is a u32, so the attacker simply sets it to the wrapped value.

Corruption sink — data/src/tensor.rs::as_slice_unchecked (and data/src/tensor/plain_view.rs::as_slice_unchecked):

if self.storage.byte_len() == 0 { &[] }
else { std::slice::from_raw_parts(self.as_ptr_unchecked(), self.len()) }  // len = 2^61 over a 56-byte alloc

The only guard is byte_len() == 0. A small non-zero allocation defeats it and yields an unsound oversized slice.

Witness (F64)

dims          = [33955849, 7005787, 359, 3, 3, 3]   (rank 6, each <= u32::MAX)
product(shape)= 2_305_843_009_213_693_959 = 2^61 + 7
bits_per_item = 64 (F64), item_type = 0, item_type_vendor = 0
data_size_bytes = 56            # == (2^61+7)*8 mod 2^64
  • len * (bits/8) mod 2^64 = (2^61+7)*8 mod 2^64 = 56 == data_size_bytes → consistency check passes.
  • allocation = (2^61+7)*8 mod 2^64 = 56 bytes (7 × F64).
  • reported len = 2^61+7 elements.

Only the is_copy() numeric arms (F16/F32/F64/int, and likely the complex arms) are exploitable. F64 is the cleanest (bits/8 divides evenly). The bool, String, and block-quant paths are each guarded by an independent mechanism (size_of==1 prevents byte/element divergence; String bails on a missing num_traits::Zero impl; block-quant has its own ensure!(expected_len == data_size_bytes) and uses non-plain Exotic storage).

Reachability (load-time, public API)

nnef().model_for_read(tar)
  -> proto_model_for_read                       nnef/src/framework.rs:303
    -> DatLoader.try_load (any *.dat)            nnef/src/resource.rs:97   (default loader, framework.rs:33)
      -> read_tensor -> Ok(Tensor{len=2^61+7, storage=56B})   nnef/src/tensors.rs:61
  -> into_typed_model -> variable() fragment     nnef/src/ops/nnef/deser.rs:74
       ensure!(tensor.shape() == &*shape)        deser.rs:122  (attacker matches shape in graph.nnef -> passes)
    -> Const::new -> wire_node                   core/src/model/typed.rs:67
      -> Const::output_facts                     core/src/ops/konst.rs:54
        -> TypedFact::try_from                   core/src/model/fact.rs:459
          -> Tensor::as_uniform -> is_uniform_t::<f64>   data/src/tensor.rs:1099
            -> as_slice_unchecked::<f64>         data/src/tensor.rs:1044
              -> from_raw_parts(ptr, 2^61+7) over 56-byte buffer -> OOB READ

No shape-vs-storage re-validation exists anywhere on this path (proto.validate() checks only the AST; Const::new checks only is_plain; check_for_access checks only the datum type; even the *safe* PlainView::as_slice does from_raw_parts(ptr, self.len) with no length guard).

Execution (proof of concept)

Reproduced against the crate at the affected revision, --release, x86_64-linux. Three scenarios:

  1. Direct `read_tensor` — feed the crafted 128-byte header + 56-byte payload:
  • read_tensor -> Ok, shape=[33955849,7005787,359,3,3,3], len()=2305843009213693959, as_bytes().len()=56, as_slice::<f64>().len()=2305843009213693959.
  • s[7] (first element past the 56-byte allocation) returns 0x0000000000000041 → heap OOB read (adjacent-heap disclosure).
  • s[1<<40] → SIGSEGV (signal 11).
  1. Public load API — build a malicious .nnef.tar (graph.nnef with variable(label='weights', shape=[...]) + weights.dat) and call nnef().model_for_read():
  • returns Ok with one Const node, out[0].fact.uniform=Some(...), len()=2305843009213693959 over a 56-byte buffer → confirms as_uniform/is_uniform_t/as_slice_unchecked performed an OOB read on load (bounded over-read here because is_uniform's .all() short-circuits on the uniform 0x41 payload).
  1. Optimized graph — same archive but the const is consumed (output = mul(weights, weights)), then into_optimized / run:
  • Does not crash. With both a uniform (0x41×56) and a non-uniform (0..56) payload, into_optimized const-folds mul(const, const) to a single node without a full-length materialization of the oversized const, and run completes. A reliable arbitrary-length crash through a *normal optimized graph* was therefore NOT demonstrated; the always-on primitive is the bounded load-time over-read (scenario 2), and the wild-slice SIGSEGV is shown via direct access (scenario 1).

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-06-18 15:05 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:50 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

tract-nnef

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.23.0, fixed 0.23.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.23.1

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.23.1
    cargo update -p tract-nnef --precise 0.23.1

tract-nnef

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.22.0, fixed 0.22.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.22.2

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.22.2
    cargo update -p tract-nnef --precise 0.22.2

tract-nnef

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.21.16 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.21.16

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.21.16
    cargo update -p tract-nnef --precise 0.21.16

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences