wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected26.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-34740
AVideo: Stored SSRF via Video EPG Link Missing isSSRFSafeURL() Validation
Summary
The EPG (Electronic Program Guide) link feature in AVideo allows authenticated users with upload permissions to store arbitrary URLs that the server fetches on every EPG page visit. The URL is validated only with PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_URL, which accepts internal network addresses. Although AVideo has a dedicated isSSRFSafeURL() function for preventing SSRF, it is not called in this code path. This results in a stored server-side request forgery vulnerability that can be used to scan internal networks, access cloud metadata services, and interact with internal services.
Details
When a user adds or edits a video, the EPG link is stored via objects/videoAddNew.json.php:119:
$obj->setEpg_link($_POST['epg_link']);
The only validation applied is FILTER_VALIDATE_URL, which accepts URLs targeting internal addresses such as http://127.0.0.1, http://169.254.169.254, or http://10.0.0.1.
Later, when the EPG data is parsed, the stored URL is fetched server-side at objects/EpgParser.php:358:
$this->content = @\file_get_contents($this->url);
The file_get_contents() function follows redirects and supports multiple protocols including http://, https://, ftp://, and depending on PHP configuration, php:// and other stream wrappers.
The codebase contains an isSSRFSafeURL() function that validates URLs against internal network ranges, but this function is not invoked anywhere in the EPG link processing path.
Because the URL is stored in the database, every subsequent visit to the EPG page re-triggers the server-side request. This makes the SSRF persistent and repeatable without further attacker interaction.
Proof of Concept
# Target the cloud metadata service
curl -b "PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION" \
-X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/videoAddNew.json.php" \
-d "title=Test+Video&epg_link=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
curl -b "PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION" \
"https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/Live/view/Live_schedule/?videos_id=VIDEO_ID"
# Scan an internal service
curl -b "PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION" \
-X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/videoAddNew.json.php" \
-d "title=Test+Video&epg_link=http://127.0.0.1:6379/"
file_get_contents(). Response differences (timing, error messages, or returned content via EPG display) reveal whether internal services are running.Impact
An authenticated user with upload permissions can force the AVideo server to make HTTP requests to arbitrary internal and external targets. This enables scanning of internal networks, access to cloud instance metadata (potentially exposing IAM credentials on AWS/GCP/Azure), and interaction with internal services that are not intended to be externally accessible. The stored nature of this SSRF means it re-executes on every page visit, amplifying the impact.
Recommended Fix
Add an isSSRFSafeURL() check before the file_get_contents() call at objects/EpgParser.php:355:
if (function_exists('isSSRFSafeURL') && !isSSRFSafeURL($this->url)) {
throw new \RuntimeException('URL blocked by SSRF protection');
}
This reuses the existing SSRF protection function that is already applied in other code paths.
---
*Found by aisafe.io*
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0