Advisory

GHSA-x6mc-67gf-chw4

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Option 2 composes with #51969 and needs no per-backend audit; I would favour it, but option 1 is the more conservative change and matches what has already been merged.

Affected versions

>= 0.24.0, through v0.29.1rc0 and main @ b23433088.

Lower bound established by probing release tags through the GitHub contents API; no version below is inferred, each was read out of the file at that tag.

Confirmed present — Qwen samplers reading unclamped `max_frames` (max_frames = kwargs.get("max_frames", 768) inside Qwen2VLVideoBackend / Qwen3VLVideoBackend in vllm/multimodal/video.py):

| ref | Qwen3VLVideoBackend present | unclamped max_frames |
|---|---|---|
| v0.23.0 | no (class does not exist) | n/a |
| v0.24.0 | yes | yes |
| v0.25.0, v0.26.0, v0.27.0, v0.28.0, v0.29.0, v0.29.1rc0 | yes | yes |
| main @ b23433088 | yes | yes |

Confirmed present — request-level `media_io_kwargs` (field on the chat request model, and VideoMediaIO.merge_kwargs present): every ref probed, v0.19.0 through v0.29.1rc0 and main @ b23433088.

Confirmed absent — any `num_frames` ceiling clamp (PR #51969 unmerged): every ref probed, v0.19.0 through v0.29.1rc0 and main @ b23433088.

Not resolved, and why:

  1. The introducing commit/PR for Qwen2VLVideoBackend / Qwen3VLVideoBackend. My clone is shallow (--depth=300), so git log -S'max_frames' cannot reach it; the v0.23.0 → v0.24.0 boundary above is the tightest bound I established by probing release tags.
  2. The rc tags between v0.23.0 and v0.24.0, to tighten the lower bound to a specific release candidate.
  3. Whether a max_frames knob on a *differently named* pre-v0.24.0 backend is separately affected — at v0.23.0 GLMGAVideoBackend already carried max_frames = kwargs.get("max_frames", 640) with no clamp, and that clamp was only added on 2026-09-04 by 8b6de0eb9. Versions between are plausibly affected through GLMGA rather than Qwen; I did not test that path.
  4. Whether GHSA-vxqj-p4gw-9h4c's own affected range differs, which I cannot see — the advisory returns 404 to me.

No dependency versions are asserted anywhere in this report.

Weaknesses of this report, stated upfront

  • No GPU was used. This host has no CUDA device, so the HTTP results come from the in-tree GPU-less render server rather than a full vllm serve. That server runs the real frontend — the same request model, the same merge_media_io_kwargs → VideoMediaIO.merge_kwargs → MediaConnector.fetch_video chain, the same /tokenize route — and media decoding happens entirely in the frontend, so I do not believe the engine's presence changes the result. I have not confirmed that on a GPU deployment, and a reviewer may reasonably want that repeated under vllm serve.
  • The in-process measurements (the #51969 comparison table) were taken by importing the tree directly at b23433088, verified by __file__, with no vllm wheel installed.
  • Amplification figures are a floor. The OpenCV build available here offers only mp4v/XVID, giving ~2 200× compression on static content. An attacker using x264/x265 would do materially better for the same frame count.
  • The two large figures in the Impact section (9.73 GiB RSS; the OOM kill) were measured on the num_frames path, not this one, and are labelled as such.
  • Per-frame pixels remain bounded by VLLM_MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS; this concerns the unbounded frame *count*, which multiplies it.
  • VLLM_MAX_MEDIA_DOWNLOAD_SIZE_MB (default 256) caps the compressed size of an HTTP-fetched video but not a data: URI, which MediaConnector.load_from_url dispatches before any size logic is reached.

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*Prepared with AI assistance (Claude), per the repository's contributing guidance on disclosing AI-assisted contributions. All findings were verified by executing vLLM's own code at the commits cited; the analysis and the claims are my own.*

*Reported by Eva Crystal / 0xiviel (XSource Security).*

Sources & licences