Advisory

GHSA-x78j-v8h9-3j2q

Also known as: BIT-virtualenv-2026-102937, CVE-2026-102937, PYSEC-2026-4014

Summary

virtualenv: Command injection via --prompt in activate.bat (batch activator)

Details

BatchActivator.quote() returned its input unchanged, the only activator with no escaping at all. --prompt, the VIRTUALENV_PROMPT environment variable, and the config file all set the prompt, and activate.bat writes it straight into @set "VAR=value". A prompt containing a double quote closes that string early, and whatever follows runs as live cmd.exe syntax:

$ virtualenv --prompt 'x" & calc & "' venv
$ venv\Scripts\activate.bat

runs calc the moment someone activates the environment. Confirmed on a real Windows runner. Anyone who templates a prompt from untrusted input (a CI job using a branch name, a wrapper script deriving an environment name from user input) hands an attacker code execution in the shell of anyone who activates the resulting venv on Windows.

Fixed in 21.7.12 by escaping the characters cmd.exe treats as live syntax inside this construct. Fix: https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3250

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-10-01 15:08 UTC
Modified
2026-10-06 15:26 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

virtualenv

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 21.7.12 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

21.7.12

Fix

  • Fixed version 21.7.12
    pip install --upgrade virtualenv==21.7.12

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences