go.probo.inc/probo
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.204.0(semver)
Fixed versions
0.204.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.204.0go get go.probo.inc/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-49820, GO-2026-5861
Probo has an open redirect bypass via path normalization
Impact
Probo's saferedirect package validates redirect URLs used across authentication flows (OIDC, SAML, session transfer, OAuth connectors, and trust-center magic links). The validator only inspected the second character of relative paths, so a URL like /../\evil.com passed validation because the second character is .. Go's http.Redirect normalizes this path to /\evil.com before setting the Location header. Browsers can interpret the backslash as a host separator and redirect the user to an external domain (https://evil.com), bypassing the intended same-origin restriction. This enables open-redirect phishing: an attacker can craft a continue parameter (or embed a malicious URL in a session-transfer token) that appears to originate from a trusted Probo domain but redirects victims elsewhere.
Patches
Fixed in go.probo.inc/probo by normalizing relative paths with path.Clean before validation, rejecting backslashes (including
percent-encoded %5c) anywhere in the path, and re-checking the normalized result for protocol-relative and backslash prefixes.
Self-hosted deployments should upgrade to probod v0.194.1 or later.
SaaS deployments on getprobo.com are patched.
Workarounds
No practical workaround for self-hosted installations. Upgrade to the patched release.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.204.0 (semver)0.204.0
0.204.0go get go.probo.inc/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0