Advisory

GHSA-x7qq-m748-8p2c

Also known as: CVE-2026-49820, GO-2026-5861

Summary

Probo has an open redirect bypass via path normalization

Details

Impact
Probo's saferedirect package validates redirect URLs used across authentication flows (OIDC, SAML, session transfer, OAuth connectors, and trust-center magic links). The validator only inspected the second character of relative paths, so a URL like /../\evil.com passed validation because the second character is .. Go's http.Redirect normalizes this path to /\evil.com before setting the Location header. Browsers can interpret the backslash as a host separator and redirect the user to an external domain (https://evil.com), bypassing the intended same-origin restriction. This enables open-redirect phishing: an attacker can craft a continue parameter (or embed a malicious URL in a session-transfer token) that appears to originate from a trusted Probo domain but redirects victims elsewhere.

Patches
Fixed in go.probo.inc/probo by normalizing relative paths with path.Clean before validation, rejecting backslashes (including
percent-encoded %5c) anywhere in the path, and re-checking the normalized result for protocol-relative and backslash prefixes.

Self-hosted deployments should upgrade to probod v0.194.1 or later.

SaaS deployments on getprobo.com are patched.

Workarounds
No practical workaround for self-hosted installations. Upgrade to the patched release.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-06-30 18:31 UTC
Modified
2026-07-07 16:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

go.probo.inc/probo

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.204.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.204.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences