Advisory

GHSA-xc7j-3g8q-9vh4

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Proof of concept

Setup

  1. Install YesWiki and log in as admin (or as any user with the saisie_formulaire ACL).
  2. Navigate to *Bazar → Formulaires → Nouveau formulaire* and create a form. Add any field of type range, email, or any other field type (every field type renders through layouts/input.twig, so the title= / alt= / label-body vectors apply universally).

PoC 1 — range.twig placeholder attribute breakout (Sink class [B])

Set the field's label to:

Enter value" onmouseover="alert('XSS via field.label in range.twig')" x="

Save the form. Have any visitor (including unauthenticated guests if the form is published) open a page that renders the form. Hovering the range input fires the injected handler.

Rendered HTML:

<input type="range" … placeholder="Enter value" onmouseover="alert('XSS via field.label in range.twig')" x="" required />

PoC 2 — layouts/input.twig tooltip injection (Sink class [C])

Set the field's hint (Aide) to:

"><script>alert('XSS via field.hint in layouts/input.twig — fires on EVERY field type')</script><span x="

Save. Any page that renders the form executes the script at parse time, before any user interaction. The vector is universal because layouts/input.twig is the base template extended by every field type.

PoC 3 — layouts/input.twig label-body injection (Sink class [D])

Set the field's label to:

<img src=x onerror="alert('XSS via field.label in layouts/input.twig')">

Save. Page render fires the onerror immediately — no hover, no click, no striptags filter in the way.

Impact

Direct

  • Stored XSS on every visitor of any Bazar form page — a privileged form editor injects script into a field's label/hint and the script runs in the wiki origin against every viewer of the form, including unauthenticated guests. Cookie theft, session hijack of any admin who visits, full content modification, phishing overlays.
  • Universal sink in `layouts/input.twig` — sinks [C] and [D] live in the base layout extended by every field type, so a single field with a malicious hint poisons every form render across the wiki, not just forms using a specific input type.

Indirect / second-order

  • Privilege amplification despite `saisie_formulaire` being admin-only by default — many deployments grant saisie_formulaire to specific user groups (per-deployment ACL configured via config['permissions']['action']['saisie_formulaire']). For those deployments, the bug is exploitable by any user in those groups against any visitor. The audit pattern at commit fe7244b (the same team explicitly gated imported-form POST handling on saisie_formulaire) demonstrates that saisie_formulaire is in fact a "trusted-input" boundary — outputs of that boundary should not assume HTML-safety.
  • Composability with the unpatched POI/CSRF in `BazarImportAction` (reported separately as `01-bazarimport-poi-csrf.md`) — once any XSS exists in the wiki origin, an attacker can fetch a CSRF token (if added as part of the POI fix) and chain XSS → POI → RCE without needing to phish the admin onto a third-party origin.
  • The pre-`fe7244b` window — for any deployment still running a build that predates fe7244b (the imported-form auth fix from 2026-05-12), the source of field.label / field.hint was reachable from unauthenticated POST to the imported-form handler, making this finding unauth-stored-XSS on those builds. The current code path closes that source side, but reinforces that the sink-side fix at e6b66aa should be applied class-wide.

Suggested fix

Apply the same transformation e6b66aa applied to text.twig / textarea.twig placeholders, class-wide:

  • For attribute contexts (placeholder=, title=, alt=, etc.) — drop the raw filter. Let Twig's attribute-context autoescape handle the value:
  placeholder="{{ field.label|striptags|trim }}"
  title="{{ field.hint|striptags|trim }}"
  alt="{{ field.hint|striptags|trim }}"

striptags is fine to keep if there's a UX reason to strip incidental HTML; the security is in the absence of raw.

  • For label-body contexts (<label>{{ field.label|raw }}</label>) — decide which is the design intent and apply it everywhere:
  • If labels really need to render bold/italic/links: pass field.label through HtmlPurifierService::cleanHTML() at the point where the field object is constructed (i.e. BazarField::__construct's $this->label = … line), so any subsequent template emits already-purified HTML and raw becomes safe.
  • If labels are plain text: drop the raw filter and let {{ field.label }} autoescape.

The label-body case in layouts/input.twig:9, layouts/field.twig:5, and the four inputs/*.twig files is the highest-impact patch target because it's reached by every field type; the attribute-context cases are more surgical.

Sweep target list (all in tools/bazar/templates/):

  • inputs/range.twig:19
  • inputs/email.twig:13
  • layouts/input.twig:7, 9
  • layouts/field.twig:5
  • inputs/textarea.twig:14, 16
  • inputs/user.twig:41, 55
  • inputs/bookmarklet.twig:4, 6
  • inputs/subscribe.twig:16
  • inputs/linked-entry.twig:4

A grep-driven CI check for |raw('html') and |raw inside Bazar twig templates would surface any future reintroduction.

Sources & licences