Details
Run
docker compose up -d
python3 poc.py
Expected Vulnerable Output
/admin 401
/internal/config 401
/api/admin 404
/api/internal/config 404
/api../admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin
/api%2e%2e/admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin
/api../internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config
/api%2e%2e/internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config
/api../admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached
/api%2e%2e/admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached
Root Cause Hypothesis
The vulnerable behavior appears to be caused by path normalization after prefix stripping.
Incoming path: /api../admin
After StripPrefix("/api"): /../admin
After JoinPath(): /admin
The request does not match the protected /admin router at the routing stage, but the backend receives /admin after normalization.
The relevant behavior appears related to StripPrefix calling req.URL.JoinPath() after removing the prefix in newer versions.
Security Impact
An unauthenticated network attacker can bypass intended Traefik route-level authentication/authorization boundaries and access backend paths that the operator intended to protect with a separate protected router.
Potential impact includes:
- Access to protected admin paths
- Access to internal configuration endpoints
- Exposure of secrets returned by internal backends
- Access to protected backend management functionality
- Conditional RCE if the protected backend exposes an execution primitive
In the local lab, a protected /admin/exec endpoint was reachable through /api../admin/exec, demonstrating a conditional RCE chain when the backend contains an execution primitive.
This is not a standalone Traefik RCE claim. It is an authentication/authorization boundary bypass that can expose protected backend functionality.
Suggested Severity
Suggested CVSS is 10.0 Critical with Scope Changed, because the bypass crosses the Traefik route-level authorization boundary and exposes protected backend functionality.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Scope Changed was selected because the request bypasses Traefik's route-level authorization boundary and reaches backend paths that are intended to be protected by a separate authenticated router.
If the vendor treats Traefik and the backend as the same security scope, the score may be interpreted as 9.1 Critical with Scope Unchanged:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
The issue was submitted with the stronger Scope Changed interpretation, but the maintainers may adjust the final CVSS score during triage.
Weakness
Primary CWE:
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
Related weakness candidates:
CWE-180: Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before CanonicalizeCWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Mitigation Verified in Lab
The bypass was blocked when using a stricter prefix boundary:
PathRegexp(`^/api(/|$)`)
or:
PathPrefix(`/api/`) with StripPrefix(`/api/`)
Relation to Existing Advisories
This appears related to the same vulnerability family as prior Traefik path normalization / StripPrefixRegex bypass advisories, but it affects StripPrefix and remains reproducible on patched/latest versions tested above.
This was reported as a possible incomplete fix or bypass variant rather than assuming it is a duplicate.
Reporter
WonYun / kyun0
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