github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve
Affected
- introduced
0.6.0, fixed0.11.6(semver)
Fixed versions
0.11.6
Fix
- Fixed version
0.11.6go get github.com/charmbracelet/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33353, GO-2026-4788
In Soft Serve, an authenticated repo import can clone server-local private repositories
Summary
An authorization flaw in repo import allows any authenticated SSH user to clone a server-local Git repository, including another user's private repo, into a new repository they control. This breaks the private-repository confidentiality boundary and should be treated as High severity.
Details
Repo import checks authorization only for the destination repository name, not for the source remote. The destination-side authorization comes from `pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go:172`, which calls `pkg/backend/user.go:46`. If the destination repo does not already exist, any authenticated user is granted ReadWriteAccess at `pkg/backend/user.go:94`.
The import command then passes the user-controlled REMOTE into `pkg/backend/repo.go:102`. In vulnerable HEAD, git.Clone(remote, rp, copts) is reached without validating that remote is actually a network remote. As a result, a user can supply a server filesystem path such as $DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git and cause the server to clone its own local bare repository into a new repo owned by the attacker.
The relevant vulnerable flow is:
PoC
Configuration:
Reproduction steps:
soft repo create secret -p
soft user create user1 --key "$USER1_AUTHORIZED_KEY"
git clone ssh://localhost:$SSH_PORT/secret secret
echo 'top secret' > secret/SECRET.txt
git -C secret add SECRET.txt
git -C secret commit -m 'first'
git -C secret push origin HEAD
usoft repo info secret
Expected result:
Error: repository not found
usoft repo import stolen "$DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git" --lfs-endpoint http://example.com
ugit clone ssh://localhost:$SSH_PORT/stolen stolen-clone
cat stolen-clone/SECRET.txt
Expected result:
top secret
Notes:
--lfs-endpoint value is needed to avoid later LFS endpoint handling rejecting the local-path import.Impact
This is an authorization bypass and confidentiality issue.
Any authenticated SSH user on a multi-user Soft Serve instance can duplicate server-local Git repositories into new repositories they own, even when they are not a collaborator and direct access to the original private repo is denied. The primary impact is unauthorized disclosure of private source code and any secrets committed to those repositories.
Impacted parties:
repo importPractical impact:
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0.6.0, fixed 0.11.6 (semver)0.11.6
0.11.6go get github.com/charmbracelet/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0