Advisory

GHSA-xh8f-g2qw-gcm7

Also known as: CVE-2026-42600, GO-2026-5757

Summary

MinIO vulnerable to Path Traversal via msgpack Body in ReadMultiple Storage-REST Endpoint

Details

Impact

_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_

A path traversal vulnerability in MinIO's ReadMultiple internode storage-REST
endpoint allows a caller holding the cluster root JWT to read files from
outside the configured drive roots, bounded only by the MinIO process UID.

Distributed-erasure (multi-node) MinIO deployments are impacted. Single-node
standalone deployments do not register the route and are not affected. The
attack requires an HS512 JWT signed with MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD and carrying
accessKey = MINIO_ROOT_USER — the same secret every peer in the cluster
holds to authenticate internode traffic, so a compromised peer or any actor in
possession of the root credential can mint one.

The ReadMultiple handler (cmd/storage-rest-server.go) decodes a msgpack
ReadMultipleReq body containing Bucket, Prefix, and Files fields and
forwards them to xlStorage.ReadMultiple (cmd/xl-storage.go) without
validation:

volumeDir := pathJoin(s.drivePath, req.Bucket)          // traversal resolves here
for _, f := range req.Files {
    fullPath := pathJoin(volumeDir, req.Prefix, f)
    data, mt, err = s.readAllDataWithDMTime(ctx, req.Bucket, volumeDir, fullPath)
}

pathJoin calls path.Clean, which resolves .. components and produces an
absolute path anywhere on the filesystem — it is not a root jail. The global
setRequestValidityMiddleware rejects .. in r.URL.Path and r.Form but
does not inspect request bodies, so msgpack-encoded traversal bypasses it.
Sibling storage methods (StatInfoFile, ReadFileHandler, ReadVersion)
validate their volume argument through s.getVolDir(volume), which rejects
..; ReadMultiple skips this call.

The attacker sends POST /minio/storage/{drivePath}/v63/rmpl with a
msgpack-encoded body carrying ../ sequences in the Bucket field. The
server opens the resulting path via os.OpenFile with O_RDONLY|O_NOATIME
and returns its contents in the msgpack response stream.

Impact by deployment:

  • Bare-metal with `User=minio` in the systemd unit — the O_NOATIME ownership check bounds the read to files owned by the MinIO UID. Reachable secrets include TLS private keys, KMS/KES key material, systemd credentials, and data belonging to other tenants sharing the same UID on the host. Secrets leaked this way persist across cluster credential rotation.
  • Containerized running as UID 0 (the historical default for the official Docker image, docker-compose examples, and Helm charts without securityContext.runAsNonRoot) — the primitive escalates to arbitrary host-filesystem disclosure: /etc/shadow, /root/**, Kubernetes service-account tokens, cloud-init metadata caches.

Affected components: cmd/storage-rest-server.go (ReadMultiple handler),
cmd/xl-storage.go (xlStorage.ReadMultiple).

CWE: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
— 'Path Traversal')

CVSS v4.0 Score: 6.9 (Medium)

Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Affected Versions

All MinIO releases from RELEASE.2022-07-24T01-54-52Z through the final
release of the minio/minio open-source project, RELEASE.2025-09-07T16-13-09Z.

The vulnerability was introduced in commit
`f939d1c18`
("Independent Multipart Uploads",
PR #15346), which added the
ReadMultiple storage-REST endpoint as part of the multipart upload
redesign. The first affected release is RELEASE.2022-07-24T01-54-52Z.

Patches

Fixed in: MinIO AIStor RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z (recommended
upgrade target). The fix — which removed the ReadMultiple handler, the
corresponding storage-driver method, the msgpack datatypes, the REST-client
wrapper, and the route registration — first shipped in **MinIO AIStor
RELEASE.2024-10-23T19-38-07Z**. Every AIStor release from
RELEASE.2024-10-23T19-38-07Z onward is unaffected; users should upgrade to
RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z or later to pick up the accumulated fixes and
improvements shipped since.

Binary Downloads

| Platform | Architecture | Download |
| -------- | ------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Linux | amd64 | minio |
| Linux | arm64 | minio |
| macOS | arm64 | minio |
| macOS | amd64 | minio |
| Windows | amd64 | minio.exe |

FIPS Binaries

| Platform | Architecture | Download |
| -------- | ------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Linux | amd64 | minio.fips |
| Linux | arm64 | minio.fips |

Package Downloads

| Format | Architecture | Download |
| ------ | ------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| DEB | amd64 | minio_20260414213245.0.0_amd64.deb |
| DEB | arm64 | minio_20260414213245.0.0_arm64.deb |
| RPM | amd64 | minio-20260414213245.0.0-1.x86_64.rpm |
| RPM | arm64 | minio-20260414213245.0.0-1.aarch64.rpm |

Container Images

# Standard
docker pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z
podman pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z

# FIPS
docker pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z.fips
podman pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z.fips

Homebrew (macOS)

brew install minio/aistor/minio

Workarounds

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-05-05 20:05 UTC
Modified
2026-10-08 08:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/minio/minio

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.0.0-20220724015452, fixed 0.0.0-20260414213245 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.0.0-20260414213245

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences