Advisory

GHSA-xmfg-f9cm-w86q

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Affected Versions

  • Ecosystem: PyPI
  • Package: nltk
  • Confirmed affected range: >= 3.9.4, <= 3.10.3
  • Latest release checked: 3.10.3 (PyPI, wheel SHA-256 ff9598a8e20518ee0d557745890cc4435b9578489e2dcbc69c4f81fa060caf7c)
  • Fix status: 3.10.4

The pathsec sandbox that this issue bypasses was introduced in 3.9.4; the immediately preceding release 3.9.3 does not ship nltk/pathsec.py and therefore does not present this sandbox-escape surface. Every published release from 3.9.4 through the current latest 3.10.3 ships nltk/pathsec.py with ENFORCE = True and ships sql_query() without any containment check, so all of them are affected. Each affected wheel was fetched from PyPI and inspected directly. No published release removes the sink or adds the guard, so no fixed version exists at the time of review.

Suggested Fix

Enforce the data-root containment invariant on the resolved database path before opening it. In sql_query(), validate the path through the same mechanism the sibling functions use (for example validate_path(str(path), context="chat80.sql_query")) or open the database through the pointer's sandboxed open path rather than passing the raw string to sqlite3.connect(). The remediation should resolve symbolic links (real-path resolution) and reject targets outside the registered data roots, and it should cover any other read sinks that connect to on-disk databases resolved through nltk.data.find. As an interim mitigation, applications should ensure that no attacker-writable directory is registered as an NLTK data root and should avoid calling sql_query/sql_demo on resources that live in shared or untrusted locations.

Reported by zx (GitHub: @manus-pi).

Fix status (2026-09-28)

Status: IN PROGRESS (fix on an open pull request, not yet on develop).

PR: #3888 "Validate chat80.sql_query dbname for path containment (CWE-59/73)", open; head e0e890f51 at the time of this note. This is the same sink and vector as GHSA-xv54-447f-mj22 (now closed).

Fix commits: 9f5d2ea6d (sql_query calls validate_path before nltk.data.find, as cities2table, val_dump and val_load already do) and 47bd0476e (the file behind a sql_query resource name is resolved through the data roots and validated, and its store is pinned).

The advisory PoC (an in-root corpora/city_database/city.db symlink to an out-of-root SQLite file, resolved through find()) re-run on the PR head e0e890f51: refused with PermissionError (Security Violation [chat80.sql_query]: Unauthorized path, naming the symlink's resolved out-of-root target); the same resource name backed by a real in-root database still returns its rows on that head. On develop 2fa3f48fe the PoC returns the rows of the out-of-root database, so develop is VULNERABLE.

Probe: nltk/test/unit/security_probes/ghsa_xv54_447f_mj22.py on the PR (the sibling advisory GHSA-xv54-447f-mj22), FIXED on the PR head (absolute path, traversal and a symlink inside a scratch directory are all security-rejected). Those three cases are also rejected on develop by find() itself; the in-root symlink above is the case that only the PR closes.

Release: none.

Sources & licences