openclaw
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2026.3.24(semver)
Fixed versions
2026.3.24
Fix
- Fixed version
2026.3.24npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-35653
OpenClaw: browser.request still allows POST /reset-profile through the operator.write surface
> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.
Title
browser.request still allows POST /reset-profile through the operator.write surface in OpenClaw v2026.3.22 after GHSA-vmhq-cqm9-6p7q
Severity Assessment
High
CWE:
CWE-863: Incorrect AuthorizationProposed CVSS v3.1:
8.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H)An authenticated caller who only has access to the scoped Gateway method browser.request on the operator.write surface can still reach a destructive persistent-profile management route.
Likely related advisory family:
GHSA-vmhq-cqm9-6p7qThis should be treated as a later-version residual or incomplete fix. The earlier fix blocked POST /profiles/create and profile deletion, but the latest released v2026.3.22 code still omits POST /reset-profile from the same mutation gate.
Impact
A caller with operator.write access to browser.request can still trigger persistent profile reset via POST /reset-profile.
This crosses the intended privilege boundary for browser profile management because the release already attempts to block adjacent persistent profile mutations on this same surface.
In practice, the allowed route reaches destructive behavior that can:
userDataDir to Trash when it existsThis is a real integrity and availability impact on persistent browser state, not a route-classification mismatch with no side effects.
Affected Component
Product:
openclawTested latest released version:
v2026.3.22e7d11f6c33e223a0dd8a21cfe01076bd76cef87aPublished artifact for that release:
openclaw-2026.3.22.tgz4dcc39c25c6cc63fedfd004f52d173716576fcf02026-03-23T10:56:05.946ZExact vulnerable paths on the shipped tag:
src/gateway/method-scopes.ts:114browser.request is placed on the operator.write surfacesrc/gateway/server-methods/browser.ts:155-165isPersistentBrowserProfileMutation(method, path) returns truesrc/browser/request-policy.ts:19-25POST /profiles/create and DELETE /profiles/:name, but not POST /reset-profilesrc/browser/routes/basic.ts:161-170POST /reset-profilesrc/browser/server-context.reset.ts:37-63resetProfile() stops the browser, closes the connection, and moves the local profile directory to Trash when presentsrc/node-host/invoke-browser.ts:240-243Relevant regression coverage gap on the shipped tag:
src/gateway/server-methods/browser.profile-from-body.test.ts:104-140POST /profiles/create and DELETE /profiles/:namePOST /reset-profilePublished artifact evidence for the exact released package:
openclaw-2026.3.22.tgz::package/dist/build-info.jsonopenclaw-2026.3.22.tgz::package/dist/gateway-cli-Cxz4pSoJ.js:11469-11525openclaw-2026.3.22.tgz::package/dist/gateway-cli-Cxz4pSoJ.js:11484-11485openclaw-2026.3.22.tgz::package/dist/request-policy-nIRryZwZ.js:9-12openclaw-2026.3.22.tgz::package/dist/routes-CdaHRCET.js:6874-6889Important release note:
Technical Reproduction
A direct control/exploit pair can be reproduced against the latest released version.
Preconditions:
[email protected]browser.requestoperator.write, not operator.adminReproduction steps:
browser.request with:method: "POST"path: "/profiles/create"body: { "name": "poc-profile" }browser.request cannot create or delete persistent browser profilesbrowser.request again with:method: "POST"path: "/reset-profile"body: { "profile": "poc-profile", "name": "poc-profile" }Why this happens in the released code:
isPersistentBrowserProfileMutation(...)POST /reset-profile as a protected mutation/reset-profile to profileCtx.resetProfile()resetProfile() performs state-changing behavior on the selected local profileDemonstrated Impact
The shipped release shows the following behavior difference:
Control case:
POST /profiles/createExploit case:
POST /reset-profilebrowser.request surfaceresetProfile(), which performs destructive profile-management operationsThe reached route has concrete side effects:
userDataDir to Trash if it existsThis is therefore a concrete authorization and policy gap on a real destructive profile-management route. It is not a complaint about the existence of browser.request by itself.
Environment
Environment used for validation:
openclaw2026.3.22v2026.3.22e7d11f6c33e223a0dd8a21cfe01076bd76cef87aopenclaw-2026.3.22.tgz4dcc39c25c6cc63fedfd004f52d173716576fcf0Explicit trust-model statement:
Scope check:
browser.request surface by itselfPOST /reset-profile remains outside that gate in the shipped releaseHigh Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2026.3.24 (semver)2026.3.24
2026.3.24npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0