Advisory

GHSA-xpv3-w29h-x7cv

Also known as: CVE-2026-49265, PYSEC-2026-4114

Summary

Oauthlib: Timing Attack Vulnerability in PKCE code_verifier Comparison (CWE-208)

Details

Summary

A timing side-channel vulnerability exists in the PKCE (RFC 7636) implementation
of the Authorization Code Grant flow. The code_challenge_method_plain function
uses Python's standard == operator for string comparison instead of a
constant-time comparison function, potentially allowing timing-based attacks.

Affected Component

  • File: oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py
  • Functions: code_challenge_method_plain, code_challenge_method_s256
  • Vulnerability Type: CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)

Technical Details

Python's == operator uses short-circuit evaluation when comparing strings:

  1. Returns False immediately if lengths differ
  2. Compares characters left-to-right, stopping at first mismatch

This means comparison time varies linearly with the length of the common prefix
between the attacker-supplied verifier and the stored challenge, creating a
measurable timing oracle.

Proof of Concept

Tested locally against oauthlib source (network jitter eliminated to isolate
pure Python execution time):

| Input | Result | Time (10M iterations) |
|---|---|---|
| Wrong first char (B + A*49) | Fast reject | 0.34106s |
| 49 chars correct (A*49 + B) | Deep compare | 0.37847s |
| Difference | | 0.03741s |

The ~37ms delta over 10M iterations corresponds to nanosecond-level differences
per call, which are statistically exploitable under controlled conditions.

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker intercepts authorization_code via Custom URI Scheme Hijacking
  2. PKCE blocks token request — attacker lacks code_verifier
  3. Attacker sends repeated requests to /token endpoint measuring response times
  4. Using timing oracle, attacker recovers code_verifier character by character
  5. Attacker obtains Access Token → Account Takeover

> Note: Practical exploitability is limited due to the single-use nature of
> authorization codes and real-world network noise. However, the vulnerable
> pattern should be corrected as a defense-in-depth measure.

Recommended Fix

Replace == with hmac.compare_digest() for constant-time comparison:

cr: Elvin Latifli

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-09-29 17:56 UTC
Modified
2026-10-13 16:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

oauthlib

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 3.0.0, fixed 4.0.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.0.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 4.0.0
    pip install --upgrade oauthlib==4.0.0

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences