Details
Expected vulnerable output:
{
"expectations": {
"absolute_path_discloses_outside_file": true,
"inside_control_expands_workspace_file": true,
"missing_control_leaves_missing_reference": true,
"relative_parent_traversal_discloses_outside_file": true,
"shell_control_does_not_create_file": true
},
"samples": {
"absolute_escape": "Review absolute outside:\nPRAISONAI_CUSTOM_COMMAND_CANARY=outside-workspace\n",
"inside_control": "Review inside:\nINSIDE_FILE=allowed\n",
"missing_control": "Missing stays literal:\[email protected]",
"relative_escape": "Review outside:\nPRAISONAI_CUSTOM_COMMAND_CANARY=outside-workspace\n",
"shell_control": "Shell substitution is escaped:\n\\$(touch SHOULD_NOT_EXIST)"
},
"vulnerable": true,
"yaml_dependency": "installed"
}
The PoC does not contact a model provider or any external service. It stops at the interpolation step that praisonai run --command uses before calling _run_prompt().
Impact
An attacker who can supply or modify a repository can add a project command such as .praisonai/commands/review.md containing @../outside_secret.txt or another process-readable path outside the project. If the operator runs that project command, PraisonAI expands the outside file into the prompt. In normal use that prompt may be sent to a hosted model provider, logged, or displayed to a lower-trust caller.
This report claims confidentiality impact only. It does not claim code execution, arbitrary write, credential theft without user interaction, persistence, or network scanning.
Suggested severity: Medium under the local untrusted-repository threat model because the operator must run a project-defined command.
Suggested CVSS 3.1 vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Relevant CWEs:
- CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
- CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Suggested Fix
Resolve command @path references through a single containment helper before opening files:
- Resolve the project root or intended command workspace once.
- For relative references, join to that root and then call
resolve(). - For absolute references, either reject them outright or require
resolved.relative_to(root)to succeed. - Reject escaped files before any
exists(),is_file(), oropen()operation. - Apply the same boundary to project and user command templates.
- Add regression tests for
@../outside.txt,@/absolute/outside.txt, a valid in-workspace file, a missing file, and shell-substitution escaping.
Minimal shape:
def resolve_command_file(root: Path, value: str) -> Path:
root = root.resolve()
candidate = Path(value)
if not candidate.is_absolute():
candidate = root / candidate
resolved = candidate.resolve()
try:
resolved.relative_to(root)
except ValueError as exc:
raise PermissionError(f"command file reference escapes workspace: {value}") from exc
return resolved
Affected Package/Versions
The feature was introduced by commit 88cf0c29. Current release tags now contain that commit, and PyPI currently publishes praisonai through 4.6.71.
introducing commit: 88cf0c29
earliest affected release observed: v4.6.65
latest affected release observed: v4.6.71
latest PyPI version checked: 4.6.71
unaffected sampled tag: v4.6.64
fixed version: none identified yet
Affected package entry:
Ecosystem: pip
Package: praisonai
Vulnerable versions: >= 4.6.65
Patched versions: none yet
Advisory History
No checked PraisonAI private advisory matched .praisonai/commands/*.md, praisonai.cli.features.custom_definitions, or custom command template @path interpolation.
The closest comparator is GHSA-2rcg-mm5h-xchx, arbitrary file read via @file: mention path traversal. This report is distinct because it is triggered by project-level custom command templates discovered from .praisonai/commands/*.md, not by a direct @file: mention path. The vulnerable code path here is TemplateInterpolator._interpolate_files() in custom_definitions.py, introduced by 88cf0c29, and the sink is praisonai run --command.
Other checked PraisonAI advisories cover Platform authorization gaps, AgentMail unsigned webhooks, localhost Host-header auth bypass, ContextGatherer/FastContext path escapes, API deploy YAML-to-Python injection, MCP and recipe policy bypasses, Dynamic Context path traversal, and file-tool path traversal. None covers this custom command template interpolation path.
References
- PraisonAI repository: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
- Introducing commit
88cf0c29: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/88cf0c29 - Current tested commit
3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab - Comparator advisory
GHSA-2rcg-mm5h-xchx: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-2rcg-mm5h-xchx - PraisonAI security policy page: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/policy
- CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
- CWE-200: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html