piccolo
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.1.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.1.1
Fix
- Fixed version
1.1.1pip install --upgrade piccolo==1.1.1
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2023-47128, PYSEC-2023-241
piccolo SQL Injection via named transaction savepoints
Summary
The handling of named transaction savepoints in all database implementations is vulnerable to SQL Injection as user provided input is passed directly to connection.execute(...) via f-strings.
Details
An excerpt of the Postgres savepoint handling:
async def savepoint(self, name: t.Optional[str] = None) -> Savepoint:
name = name or f"savepoint_{self.get_savepoint_id()}"
await self.connection.execute(f"SAVEPOINT {name}")
return Savepoint(name=name, transaction=self)
In this example, we can see user input is directly passed to connection.execute without being properly escaped.
All implementations of savepoints and savepoint methods directly pass this name parameter to connection.execute and are vulnerable to this. A non-exhaustive list can be found below:
Care should be given to ensuring all strings passed to connection.execute are properly escaped, regardless of how end user facing they may be.
Further to this, the following method also passes user input directly to an execution context however I have been unable to abuse this functionality at the time of writing. This method also has a far lower chance of being exposed to an end user as it relates to database init functionality.
PoC
The following FastAPI route can be used in conjunction with sqlmap to easily demonstrate the SQL injection.
DB = ...
@app.get("/test")
async def test(name):
async with DB.transaction() as transaction:
await transaction.savepoint(name)
Steps
sqlmap -u "http://URL/test?name=a" --batchFor sqlmap help, this usage guide may be useful. The following commands may also be helpful to see the impact.
Dumping all tables
The --tables flag will enumerate all tables accessible from within the exposed database session.
sqlmap -u "http://URL/test?name=a" --batch --tables
An example output of this can be seen in the following screenshot.
Screenshot from 2023-11-06 23-10-30
OS Shell
The --os-shell will drop the user into an OS shell on the underlying system if permissions permit. This can be seen in the attached screenshot which prints the databases current working directory.
Screenshot from 2023-11-06 22-43-50
Impact
While the likelihood of an end developer exposing a savepoints name parameter to a user is highly unlikely, it would not be unheard of. If a malicious user was able to abuse this functionality they would have essentially direct access to the database and the ability to modify data to the level of permissions associated with the database user.
A non exhaustive list of actions possible based on database permissions is:
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 1.1.1 (ecosystem)1.1.1
1.1.1pip install --upgrade piccolo==1.1.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0