github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2
Affected
- introduced
2.0.0-rc.1, last affected2.63.18(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-54089, GO-2026-5966
File Browser: Authentication Bypass via Proxy Auth Header Forgery
Summary
When FileBrowser is configured with proxy authentication (auth.method=proxy), any unauthenticated attacker who can reach the server directly can impersonate any user - including admin - by sending a single forged HTTP header. No credentials are required. Additionally, specifying a non-existent username causes the server to automatically create a new user account, providing an account creation primitive with no authorization.
This is an already known issue that has been documented in the documentation for several years, but has not been documented as a vulnerability before.
Severity
HIGH - CVSS 3.1: 8.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)
Affected Component
auth.method=proxyPrerequisite: Proxy Auth Must Be Enabled
This vulnerability is NOT exploitable on default configuration (auth.method=json). It requires the administrator to have configured proxy authentication mode. However, this is a common production deployment pattern - many organizations run FileBrowser behind a reverse proxy that handles SSO/LDAP/OAuth authentication:
In these setups, the proxy authenticates the user and passes the username via HTTP header (e.g., X-Remote-User). FileBrowser trusts this header to identify the user.
| Deployment Scenario | Exploitable? |
|---|---|
| Default install (auth.method=json) | No — JSON auth uses password verification |
| auth.method=proxy + FileBrowser only reachable via proxy (bound to 127.0.0.1 or firewalled) | No - attacker cannot reach the server directly |
| auth.method=proxy + FileBrowser port exposed to network | Yes - full admin takeover |
The third scenario is common because:
0.0.0.0 by default (e.g., -p 8085:80)The core issue is that the code itself has zero defensive checks — no trusted IP validation, no shared secret, no origin verification. The entire security model relies on network-level isolation, which is fragile and not documented as a hard requirement.
Root Cause
The ProxyAuth.Auth() function unconditionally trusts the value of an HTTP request header (configured via auth.header, e.g. X-Remote-User) to determine the authenticated user's identity. There are three distinct problems in this code:
Problem 1: No Origin Validation
The function reads the header from any HTTP request regardless of source IP. It does not verify that the request originated from a trusted reverse proxy. Any client on the network can set arbitrary HTTP headers.
File: [`auth/proxy.go`](https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/main/auth/proxy.go), lines 21-28:
func (a ProxyAuth) Auth(r *http.Request, usr users.Store, setting *settings.Settings, srv *settings.Server) (*users.User, error) {
username := r.Header.Get(a.Header) // <-- reads attacker-controlled header, no origin check
user, err := usr.Get(srv.Root, username)
if errors.Is(err, fberrors.ErrNotExist) {
return a.createUser(usr, setting, srv, username)
}
return user, err // <-- returns the user object, no password verification
}
There is no call to verify r.RemoteAddr against a list of trusted proxy IPs, no shared secret validation, and no signature check on the header value.
Problem 2: No Password Verification
Unlike JSON auth (auth/json.go) which validates the password via bcrypt, the proxy auth path returns the user object directly from the database based solely on the header value. The loginHandler in http/auth.go then mints a valid JWT for this user:
File: [`http/auth.go`](https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/main/http/auth.go), lines 121-137:
func loginHandler(tokenExpireTime time.Duration) handleFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, d *data) (int, error) {
auther, err := d.store.Auth.Get(d.settings.AuthMethod)
// ...
user, err := auther.Auth(r, d.store.Users, d.settings, d.server)
// No additional verification — if auther.Auth() returns a user, a JWT is minted
return printToken(w, r, d, user, tokenExpireTime) // <-- signs and returns JWT
}
}
Problem 3: Automatic User Creation
If the username in the header doesn't exist in the database, createUser() is called unconditionally. This creates a real user account with default permissions, a random locked password, and a home directory:
File: [`auth/proxy.go`](https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/main/auth/proxy.go), lines 30-63:
func (a ProxyAuth) createUser(usr users.Store, setting *settings.Settings, srv *settings.Server, username string) (*users.User, error) {
pwd, err := users.RandomPwd(randomPasswordLength)
// ...
user := &users.User{
Username: username, // <-- attacker-controlled
Password: hashedRandomPassword,
LockPassword: true,
}
setting.Defaults.Apply(user) // <-- inherits default permissions (may include execute, create, etc.)
// ...
err = usr.Save(user) // <-- persisted to database
return user, nil
}
This auto-creation has no opt-in flag — it is always active when proxy auth is enabled.
Complete Attack Flow
Attacker sends: POST /api/login + Header: X-Remote-User: admin
|
loginHandler() |
|-> d.store.Auth.Get("proxy") |
|-> auther.Auth(r, ...) |
|-> ProxyAuth.Auth() |
|-> r.Header.Get("X-Remote-User") -> "admin" (attacker-controlled)
|-> usr.Get(root, "admin") -> admin user (found in DB)
|-> return user, nil -> no password check
|-> printToken(w, r, d, user, ...) |
|-> jwt.NewWithClaims(HS256, claims{user: admin, perm: {admin: true}})
|-> token.SignedString(key) -> valid admin JWT returned to attacker
Proof of Concept
Here is Log testing using Low Privileges Account attacker, get forbidden
Login as low priv user then get the auth token "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.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.NN0SqBr8lFj7QUACY2770gaGXZhBZ2qJZHDJJ7vQbNM"
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
2.0.0-rc.1, last affected 2.63.18 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0