@angular/platform-server
Affected
- introduced
22.0.0-next.0, fixed22.0.0-rc.2(semver)
Fixed versions
22.0.0-rc.2
Fix
- Fixed version
22.0.0-rc.2npm install @angular/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-50168
@angular/platform-server: URL Parser Differential leading to SSRF Allowlist Bypass
An issue in the @angular/platform-server package allows remote attackers to bypass host allowlist constraints and direct server-side outgoing requests to arbitrary external endpoints. This occurs due to a parser differential between the strict WHATWG URL parser used for allowlist validation and the lenient Domino URL parser used to initialize the server emulated DOM.
When a server-side request contains a malformed URL with a double port structure (e.g., http://evil.com:80:80/path), Node's strict URL.canParse(url) logic returns false and skips host check validation entirely. However, the same malformed URL is later accepted and parsed leniently by Domino's internal parser, which resolves the origin to http://evil.com:80. The Angular SSR HTTP request interceptor (relativeUrlsTransformerInterceptorFn) then resolves all relative backend HTTP requests against this adopted origin, executing the SSRF attack.
Impact
Any Angular application utilizing server-side rendering (@angular/platform-server) that configures host routing allowlists (allowedHosts) is vulnerable to this allowlist bypass.
By sending an HTTP request with a malformed Host header (e.g. Host: evil.com:80:80) or an absolute-form request URI, an attacker can bypass the allowlist logic completely (even when configured with a strict default deny setup). The SSR application will then route all relative HttpClient outgoing API queries—which commonly carry sensitive credentials, session cookies, and internal authorization tokens—to the attacker-controlled server instead of the intended backend services. Additionally, the attacker can supply custom payloads back to the emulated DOM, leading to response injection and content poisoning within the rendered HTML served to users.
Attack Preconditions
To successfully exploit this vulnerability, the following environment parameters and application states must all concurrently exist:
@angular/platform-server).config.url to the rendering API (renderApplication or renderModule).this.http.get('/api/data')) that undergo base-URL interceptor rewriting.allowedHosts options to limit valid server locations.Patches
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
22.0.0-next.0, fixed 22.0.0-rc.2 (semver)22.0.0-rc.2
22.0.0-rc.2npm install @angular/[email protected]20.0.0-next.0, fixed 20.3.22 (semver)20.3.22
20.3.22npm install @angular/[email protected]19.0.0-next.0, fixed 19.2.23 (semver)19.2.23
19.2.23npm install @angular/[email protected]0, last affected 18.2.14 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
21.0.0-next.0, fixed 21.2.15 (semver)21.2.15
21.2.15npm install @angular/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0