Advisory

MAL-2026-10916

Also known as: None

Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.

Summary

Malicious code in python-devplatform-client (PyPI)

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

Source: amazon-inspector (8daa66fc6fa92869318e5a544d82fab2d5dff870dc4c6784f28733f84441415a)
The package's setup.py copies a telemetry.pth file into site-packages so every Python interpreter startup on the host auto-imports _telemetry_init, which spawns a daemon thread invoking _telemetry_transport.Client.initialize(). That client selects a platform-keyed asset path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe) from a list of anonymous Cloudflare Workers mirrors (package-proxy.cf5oobworker.workers.dev, cf8oobworker/cf12oobworker/cf17-ddb/cf25-6eb.workers.dev), downloads the binary with no version pinning or hash verification, chmods it 0o755, and executes it (Windows uses ctypes.windll.kernel32 CreateProcess). A fallback ServiceDiscovery routine opens raw UDP sockets to 8.8.8.8/1.1.1.1 and issues TXT lookups against tin/tina/ldr/win.dl.well1.site, concatenating numbered subdomain segments and base64-decoding them to reconstruct download endpoints — a DNS-tunneled C2 channel that survives HTTP egress filtering. The package self-describes as a Sentry-style analytics SDK (Level, DSN, Envelope, Hub, DISABLE_TELEMETRY opt-out) with placeholder metadata (Author: Platform Engineering, Summary: Internal SDK module); the analytics surface is a cover story for the download-and-execute chain. The.pth mechanism persists execution outside the package's own import path, so uninstalling the package's modules does not stop the interpreter-startup hook until the.pth file itself is removed from site-packages.

Source: kam193 (2b75d4d8e3c822aa82b716e6752c0901447845d442973ce9bc35c78b9c81c78a)
Package presents little functionality, but excessive fake 'telemetry' module. This fake telemetry is used to download and run malicious executables. Code is designed to survive different blocks: first, there is an attempt to download the executable from one of five Cloudflare Workers. If it's not successful, the code falls back to download using DNS: first, it gets a TXT record from one of c.*.dl.well1[.]site domains, depending on the system. This record returns a number, which is then used to iterate over domains in the form <0...n>.*.dl.well1[.]site and reconstruct the encoded executable from their TXT records. The downloaded binary is then executed and removed afterward. Using a PTH file ensures persistence and runs on every Python start. In this campaign, versions 0.0.1 hold disarmed code (without the necessary configuration), which is completed in further updates.

This is a continuation of the 2026-07-haproxy-config-client campaign.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-07-andreiiiiiii_i

Reasons (based on the campaign):

  • The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
  • The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
  • Downloads and executes a remote executable.
  • covering-tracks
  • persistence
  • abuses-pth
  • data-stored-in-dns

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-07-18 14:13 UTC
Modified
2026-08-05 07:21 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

python-devplatform-client

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • Versions: 0.0.1, 8.5.3, 8.5.4

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0

Sources & licences