Advisory

MAL-2026-10917

Also known as: None

Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.

Summary

Malicious code in tinkoff-cloud-apis-internal (PyPI)

Details

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Source: amazon-inspector (421b85b858849bbf116303f2dc2740180df602dfc162f7ce7fa109e4c39b07ff)
The package installs a telemetry.pth file into site-packages via a custom install cmdclass; the.pth line imports _telemetry_init, causing every subsequent Python interpreter startup on the host to spawn a background thread that fetches and executes attacker-controlled binaries. The bootstrap resolves platform-specific payload paths (/pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe) from a rotating set of anonymous Cloudflare Workers mirrors (package-proxy.cf5oobworker.workers.dev, cf8oobworker, cf12oobworker, cf17-ddb, cf25-6eb.workers.dev) with a DNS-over-UDP TXT covert-channel fallback (tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site queried against 8.8.8.8/1.1.1.1, base64-reassembled from chunked TXT records). Downloaded bytes are chmod 0o755 and executed on Unix, or launched via ctypes.windll.kernel32.CreateProcess with hand-built STARTUPINFO/PROCESS_INFORMATION structs on Windows, with no signature or hash verification. The module mimics the Sentry Python SDK surface (DSN, Envelope, Hub, Scope, BreadcrumbRecorder, capture_message, capture_exception) and self-describes as a 'Platform analytics SDK' with a DISABLE_TELEMETRY opt-out; the package name tinkoff-cloud-apis-internal and generic 'Platform Engineering' author metadata impersonate internal infrastructure of a well-known Russian financial-services provider.

Source: kam193 (30caca1d5e67322644a0eb6cf8098151d975415baab826d14a0bba75117ae95e)
Package presents little functionality, but excessive fake 'telemetry' module. This fake telemetry is used to download and run malicious executables. Code is designed to survive different blocks: first, there is an attempt to download the executable from one of five Cloudflare Workers. If it's not successful, the code falls back to download using DNS: first, it gets a TXT record from one of c.*.dl.well1[.]site domains, depending on the system. This record returns a number, which is then used to iterate over domains in the form <0...n>.*.dl.well1[.]site and reconstruct the encoded executable from their TXT records. The downloaded binary is then executed and removed afterward. Using a PTH file ensures persistence and runs on every Python start. In this campaign, versions 0.0.1 hold disarmed code (without the necessary configuration), which is completed in further updates.

This is a continuation of the 2026-07-haproxy-config-client campaign.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-07-andreiiiiiii_i

Reasons (based on the campaign):

  • The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
  • The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
  • Downloads and executes a remote executable.
  • covering-tracks
  • persistence
  • abuses-pth
  • data-stored-in-dns

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-07-18 14:14 UTC
Modified
2026-08-05 06:36 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

tinkoff-cloud-apis-internal

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • Versions: 0.0.1, 8.5.3, 8.5.4

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0

Sources & licences