@dexwilt/node-fetch
Affected
- Versions:
2.7.3
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: None
Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.
Malicious code in @dexwilt/node-fetch (npm)
The @dexwilt/node-fetch package impersonates the legitimate node-fetch project: its package metadata copies the upstream repository, author, and homepage while publishing under an unrelated scope. Its CommonJS entry point lib/index.js contains the expected node-fetch implementation followed by approximately 94 KB of additional RC4/Base64-obfuscated code. The ESM builds do not contain this appended payload.
Agent-assisted deobfuscation of the appended payload recovered a cross-platform download and execution chain. It retrieves a remote binary from an encrypted endpoint, records and verifies the downloaded file's SHA-256 value, and starts the binary with detached, hidden-window, and ignored-stdio options before unreferencing the child process. The original obfuscated source independently exposes the detached, windowsHide, stdio, environment, working-directory, size, SHA-256, and download timestamp fields used by this chain. Loading the package's declared main entry point therefore executes a concealed remote payload loader embedded after otherwise legitimate node-fetch code.
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Source: amazon-inspector (416d6cd82361af6b046d895f23d5e82a82db236a104726914595c21288e33ed0)
@dexwilt/node-fetch impersonates the popular node-fetch package under a personal scope. Its main entrypoint (lib/index.js, lib/index.mjs, lib/index.es.js) ships the legitimate node-fetch v2 source with two appended, heavily obfuscated self-executing IIFEs that contain RC4+base64 string-array decoders reconstructing calls to https.request, fs.writeFileSync, fs.chmodSync, and child_process.spawn. Execution is gated on process.env.npm_config_user_agent — set by npm/yarn/pnpm during install but absent in plain node/REPL runs — so the payload only fires inside real installs while staying dormant during casual inspection. When triggered, the code re-spawns the current Node process detached with stdio ignored, downloads a remote binary over HTTP(S), writes it to a temp directory, chmods it 0o755, and execs it detached with windowsHide and unref(). Two independent dropper IIFEs are present in the same file, each with its own decoder and download→write→spawn pipeline, increasing reliability. Any developer or build pipeline that requires or installs this package automatically runs attacker-controlled code with persistence beyond the npm process.
Not rated by the source.
2.7.3None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0