accounts-limits
Affected
- Versions:
0.0.2,33.6.6
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: None
Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.
Malicious code in accounts-limits (npm)
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
Source: amazon-inspector (69c43a5fbac213b36e4a3d7c25d7f41311e6f3f111f3b175e2f306077afbcde0)
index.js unconditionally requires./_runtime.js, which on module load selects a per-platform asset path, fetches an opaque binary from one of three Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked base64 fallback under *.dl.well1.site, writes the bytes to /tmp or the Windows TEMP directory under benign-looking names (.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.analytics_state), chmods the file 0755, and detached-spawns it via spawn('/bin/sh',...) or spawn('cmd',...). No hash or signature verification is performed and the fetched payload is unrelated to the stated 'accounts limits' purpose. Both the primary Workers hosts and DNS fallback domains are assembled at runtime by join()ing fragmented substrings (e.g. ['tin.dl.w','ell','1.site'].join(''), ['oob-worker.cf100-4','16','.workers.de','v'].join('')), and stderr is stubbed via _l() to suppress diagnostics. A second dropper at lib/telemetry.js (81KB, presented as an 'analytics SDK') duplicates the chmod-and-spawn pattern with cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', filePath+' &']) and base64-decoded buffer writes; it is staged in the tarball but not currently on the require-chain from index.js.
Not rated by the source.
0.0.2, 33.6.6None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0