bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-action-panel
Affected
- Versions:
35.3.1
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: None
Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-action-panel (npm)
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
Source: amazon-inspector (6a42e260d378e0b517e59b4656f10bb75ffe083a5f8431b4d6a908ec4dae0cb0)
On require() of the package's main entry, _compat.js reconstructs Cloudflare Workers hostnames (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) from split string fragments joined at runtime, downloads a platform-specific binary via https.get, writes it to a temp path disguised as a system file (.cache_<hex> on unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c on unix or cmd /c start /b on Windows. If the HTTPS fetch fails, the code falls back to a DNS-over-TXT channel querying chunked TXT records under sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru, base64-decodes the concatenated chunks, and uses the result as the executable payload. The child_process module is likewise obtained via require("child_"+"process") in a sibling telemetry file, and cover-story comments label the behavior as analytics/telemetry. The runtime string reconstruction of destinations, disguised filenames, detached-spawn pattern, and DNS-TXT egress-bypass channel are consistent with a load-time remote code execution dropper against any host that installs or imports this package.
Not rated by the source.
35.3.1None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0