Advisory

MAL-2026-13428

Also known as: None

Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.

Summary

Malicious code in @love-moon/conductor-cli (npm)

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

Source: amazon-inspector (7ea5d4f1af0a0b67e6f74bfb45867ce0b33136083138e3c23a56df03d8b5c902)
The conductor daemon command (bin/conductor-daemon.js -> src/daemon.js) opens a WebSocket to https://conductor.conductor-ai.top (or a user-configured backend_url) and registers a message handler that, in handleTerminalInput, writes payload.data received from the server directly into a node-pty process. The PTY is spawned by handleCreatePtyTask running either the user's default shell (/bin/bash, /bin/zsh, cmd.exe, $SHELL) or a CLI from DEFAULT_CLI_LIST, which launches codex --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox and claude --dangerously-skip-permissions — the same flags are written into the generated config.yaml by bin/conductor-config.js. Any party controlling the WebSocket peer (the Conductor backend, an impersonator on the network, or a compromised backend account) can drive arbitrary commands into the installer's shell or into an AI CLI whose local approval/sandbox gates have been disabled by default. The remote-command channel and the disabled-safety flags together provide full-host command execution driven by conductor-ai.top.

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-08-06 14:31 UTC
Modified
2026-08-06 15:34 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@love-moon/conductor-cli

npm · All systems

Affected

  • Versions: 0.7.4, 0.7.5, 0.7.6, 0.8.0

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0

Sources & licences