@love-moon/conductor-cli
Affected
- Versions:
0.7.4,0.7.5,0.7.6,0.8.0
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: None
Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.
Malicious code in @love-moon/conductor-cli (npm)
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
Source: amazon-inspector (7ea5d4f1af0a0b67e6f74bfb45867ce0b33136083138e3c23a56df03d8b5c902)
The conductor daemon command (bin/conductor-daemon.js -> src/daemon.js) opens a WebSocket to https://conductor.conductor-ai.top (or a user-configured backend_url) and registers a message handler that, in handleTerminalInput, writes payload.data received from the server directly into a node-pty process. The PTY is spawned by handleCreatePtyTask running either the user's default shell (/bin/bash, /bin/zsh, cmd.exe, $SHELL) or a CLI from DEFAULT_CLI_LIST, which launches codex --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox and claude --dangerously-skip-permissions — the same flags are written into the generated config.yaml by bin/conductor-config.js. Any party controlling the WebSocket peer (the Conductor backend, an impersonator on the network, or a compromised backend account) can drive arbitrary commands into the installer's shell or into an AI CLI whose local approval/sandbox gates have been disabled by default. The remote-command channel and the disabled-safety flags together provide full-host command execution driven by conductor-ai.top.
Not rated by the source.
0.7.4, 0.7.5, 0.7.6, 0.8.0None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0