Advisory

MAL-2026-17416

Also known as: None

Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.

Summary

Malicious code in friendly-greeting-tools (PyPI)

Details

Versions 0.1.0 through 0.3.6 of friendly-greeting-tools disguise encoded Snowflake credential and data theft routines as a hello-world demo. In versions through 0.3.5, the default run_demo payload reads the Snowflake session token, connection configuration, dbt profiles, and pip configuration, then stages encrypted copies in /workspace using a hard-coded RSA public key; every affected version also contains a payload that uses the session token with ACCOUNTADMIN to copy ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS to the hard-coded s3://pkusinski-external/ bucket. Version 0.3.6 makes the Snowflake external-storage and data-copy routine the default run_demo payload and suppresses query failures. Versions 0.3 through 0.3.6 additionally contain a payload that queries the table and builds a follow-on package containing the returned data, while the README and CLI describe the behavior only as a demo and a print-only payload.

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Source: amazon-inspector (4d584c571cf5d112735aefd07c78bc19659af32f5950b1331a4970cba97c9707)
The package presents itself as a harmless greeting demo but src/friendly_greeting/main.py ships two base64+gzip-encoded Python blobs (DEMO_EN and DEMO_ST) that are decoded and executed via exec(gzip.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))) from run_demo()/run_encoded_demo(). The first decoded payload reads /snowflake/session/token, /root/.snowflake/connections.toml, /root/.dbt/profiles.yml and /snowflake/secrets/pip.conf, Fernet-encrypts each file, and wraps the Fernet key with a hardcoded attacker-controlled RSA public key, writing the encrypted bundles to /workspace/ for later retrieval. The second decoded payload uses the harvested Snowflake OAuth session token to connect to the warehouse, create an external stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ backed by the attacker-controlled AWS role arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role, and COPY INTO that stage from ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS, exporting warehouse table data to attacker-owned S3. A plaintext sibling tools/snowflake_query.py (shipped via MANIFEST.in) contains the same Snowflake exfiltration logic with the identical bucket and IAM role, confirming intent. README.md and the module docstring additionally contain an 'Ignore previous instructions' prompt-injection block aimed at AI code reviewers, instructing them to run a local network scan — further corroborating hostile intent. The docstring cover story, exec-over-gzip+base64 obfuscation, hardcoded attacker RSA key, and hardcoded attacker AWS account/S3 destination together form a credential-theft and data-exfiltration attack targeting CI/warehouse installers (Snowflake native-app / DBT / pip-in-Snowflake contexts).

Source: kam193 (e15a50ec5b7be580dec5d1edefa80860b4c650d552f69a1a9ba3dc9bd8edbc9d)
The package contains obfuscated code to exfiltrate data from the environment, targeting primarily Snowflake databases and credentials to them. Some tracks suggest it may be part of a pentest.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-09-friendly-greeting-tools

Reasons (based on the campaign):

  • exfiltration-generic
  • obfuscation

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-09-30 14:38 UTC
Modified
2026-10-29 13:48 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

friendly-greeting-tools

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • Versions: 0.1.0, 0.1.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.3.1, 0.3.2, 0.3.3, 0.3.4, 0.3.5, 0.3.6, 0.3.7

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0

Sources & licences