Advisory

MAL-2026-17919

Also known as: None

Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.

Summary

Malicious code in ukraine69 (PyPI)

Details

Importing ukraine69 in versions 1.2.0–1.2.2 and 1.2.5–1.2.8 searches for local .vault files and starts a detached Python child with suppressed standard streams. Given a vault with usable Telegram session fields, the child attempts account.deleteAccount using GoyGram, with a Telethon fallback in versions 1.2.5–1.2.8. The payloads also attempt to remove local vault/session files and ukraine69 installation and cache traces; the condition for vault removal differs among revisions. Versions 1.2.5–1.2.8 specifically target Hotaru session vault layouts, and 1.2.7–1.2.8 additionally try auth.checkPassword if a password is present in the vault. Version 1.2.8 also attempts persistence on import: it backs up and patches a discovered Hotaru checkout's hotaru/__main__.py so a self-contained hook attempts account deletion again when Hotaru restarts, then removes the local vault/session on reported success. Version 1.2.3 instead launches import-triggered reconnaissance: a detached child reads up to three vaults in the user's home or working directory and writes their first 200 bytes plus environment and filesystem observations to local .u69_recon.log files. No external exfiltration or account-deletion call appears in 1.2.3. All listed versions advertise Ukrainian locale helpers; installation alone does not execute the module. Actual account deletion, successful Hotaru patching, later use of the local logs, and victim execution have not been established by this static analysis.

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Source: amazon-inspector (4b8244951c9ae4f7baac94c3e7fd803e3c3ceaa27d64c2561cce098bd9dddf77)
The package's __init__.py presents a benign Ukrainian-locale API (transliterate, flag, month_name, format_date) but at import time generates and launches detached, isolated Python agents via sys.executable -I -c <generated code> with start_new_session=True, inheriting the installer's HOME, cwd, and network. The spawned agents glob the installer's filesystem (~/.hotaru/**, ~/.local/share/hotaru/**, ~/**/*.vault, /tmp/hotaru*, cwd ancestors, and HOTARU_ACCOUNT_ROOT/HOTARU_ACCOUNT_SESSION-hinted paths) for *.vault files, decrypt them via goygram.security._read_vault, and extract MTProto auth_key/api_id/api_hash/dc material belonging to the installer's Telegram accounts. Using the stolen credentials, the agents connect to hardcoded Telegram DC IPv4 addresses (149.154.175.53, 149.154.167.51, 149.154.175.100, 149.154.167.91, 91.108.56.130) and invoke account.deleteAccount via multiple MTProto client surfaces (goygram dict/attribute/callable styles, raw mt.send, with a Telethon fallback), destructively deleting the installer's Telegram accounts. A follow-up _gc_script sleeps 45 seconds and then recursively removes the package from ~/.cache/hotaru/module-deps/<id>/, ~/.cache/pip/wheels, ~/.cache/pip/http-v2, ~/.cache/uv, /tmp/probe-*, and the matching site-packages dist-info, plus deletes the targeted vault and sibling .session files after successful account deletion, serving as anti-forensics self-destruct. The package's own docstring self-identifies as a Hotaru sandbox-escape payload that executes at import time.

Source: kam193 (751255a551e996471674b44aea1cac8c92313caeaf22bb1584c96e4be5036b5a)
During import, package performs actions intended to escape sandbox, find Telegram-bot session files and initiate malicious account deletion.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-10-ukraine69

Reasons (based on the campaign):

  • destructive-actions
  • covering-tracks

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-10-17 16:53 UTC
Modified
2026-10-26 06:45 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

ukraine69

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • Versions: 1.2.0, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.5, 1.2.6, 1.2.7, 1.2.8

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0

Sources & licences