Advisory

MAL-2026-3757

Also known as: None

Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.

Summary

Malicious code in claw-subagent-service (npm)

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

Source: amazon-inspector (b2ccba152d6841731431c91157874c72b5f9778fdf88b634a45ab5d9da961307)
On npm install -g, the package's scripts/post-install.js registers a privileged Windows service claw-subagent-service pointing at service/daemon.js, configured with sc.exe failure... actions= restart/0/restart/0/restart/0 and start= auto, then immediately starts it — running as LocalSystem on Windows with no opt-in prompt. Once running, three behaviors stack into a remote-control surface against the installer:

  1. Self-replacing update channel (service/updater.js): a 6-hour interval calls npm view claw-subagent-service version --json and, when a newer version is published, runs npm install -g claw-subagent-service@<latest> and restarts the worker. Any future tarball published under this name is fetched and executed under LocalSystem (Windows) / user (macOS) without consent and without honoring the operator's pinning. Linux is gated, Windows + macOS are not.
  1. Vendor-controlled IM command channel (service/worker.js, service/modules/rongyun-message-handler.js, service/modules/script-executor.js, service/rongcloud/openclaw-client.js): the worker fetches a token from https://newsradar.dreamdt.cn/im/api/claw/token/<nodeId> and joins a RongCloud IM session (appKey bmdehs6pbyyks). RongyunMessageHandler dispatches inbound COMMAND / DEVICE_CONTROL / CHAT_MESSAGE messages to handlers that spawn start.sh/stop.sh/restart.sh/status.sh, run openclaw doctor --fix, and feed attacker-supplied prompts into the local AI agent (which can in turn invoke arbitrary tools). Whoever controls the vendor IM backend (or its appKey) has persistent privileged shell-class access to every installer machine.
  1. Continuous data exfiltration (service/modules/heartbeat-dashboard.js, service/modules/dashboard-collector.js): every 30 seconds the worker reads ~/.openclaw/agents/*/sessions/*.jsonl, ~/.openclaw/projects/projects.json, ~/.openclaw/tasks/tasks.json, and the host MAC address, and ships them as 6 RongCloud IM messages to the vendor backend. Includes session contents, model-provider metadata, token-usage events, and a stable host identifier.

The README documents the product's purpose, but the combination — postinstall privileged-service persistence + 6-hour silent self-replacement + always-on remote-command IM channel + continuous session/host-id upload — is a vendor-operated remote-administration agent installed on the operator's machine via npm install. A compromise of the publisher account or the vendor IM backend yields immediate, unattended code execution on every installer host.

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-05-14 19:25 UTC
Modified
2026-08-05 17:21 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

claw-subagent-service

npm · All systems

Affected

  • Versions: 0.0.101, 0.0.102, 0.0.105, 0.0.108, 0.0.109, 0.0.110, 0.0.113, 0.0.114, 0.0.116, 0.0.117, 0.0.120, 0.0.122, 0.0.130, 0.0.136, 0.0.137, 0.0.138, 0.0.140, 0.0.141, 0.0.146, 0.0.149, 0.0.151, 0.0.153, 0.0.156, 0.0.160, 0.0.161, 0.0.162, 0.0.164, 0.0.168, 0.0.170, 0.0.177, 0.0.179, 0.0.80, 0.0.91, 0.0.99, 1.4.0

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0

Sources & licences