vectordb-engine
Affected
- Versions:
1.0.0
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: None
Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.
Malicious code in vectordb-engine (PyPI)
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
Source: amazon-inspector (42695503b90ec4adc30c038c3321d637f05038f841bcc5f463a16b891fe4e3e0)
During pip install, a custom build_ext step in src/vectordb_engine_build.py runs an obfuscated payload that performs targeted reconnaissance and exfiltration. Before doing anything else, it SHA-256-hashes the lowercased machine hostname against an obfuscated salt and compares the digest against three hardcoded allowed-hash constants; if the hostname does not match, the process calls exit() — the canonical shape of a targeted supply-chain implant that lies dormant on non-victim machines. On matching hosts, the script collects hostname, FQDN, OS, architecture, Python version, and OS username, concatenates them with | separators, XOR-encrypts the blob with a hardcoded key, hex-encodes the result, and issues an HTTPS GET to https://vectordbengine.blob.core.windows.net/kernels/?v=<encoded-fingerprint>. A separate function reads environment variables whose names are concealed behind a base85+XOR+zlib decoder (_ORQFVrfoaIJyX4SjOvpEI) and folds the values into the same exfil pipeline, consistent with scraping CI/cloud secrets without leaving readable identifiers in the source. urllib3.disable_warnings() is invoked to suppress TLS warnings. The package metadata uses placeholder publisher identity (VectorDB Contributors, [email protected]) and constructs a cover-story URL https://releases.vectordb-engine.io/kernels that is built into a string but never actually requested — it exists only as a decoy alongside the real Azure blob exfil endpoint. Each of (hostname-allowlist gating with exit() fallback, obfuscated env-var-name scraper feeding a network exfil, host-fingerprint XOR-encoded into a query string against attacker-controlled storage, decoy-domain cover story with placeholder publisher metadata) is independently sufficient evidence of a targeted attack; their joint presence leaves no benign interpretation.
Source: kam193 (b1908db5bd2b5d1d4a5ab9238d71d6da0147994c2bb812e1ffb7e0e90626e2b4)
During installation, in the build step, the code performs machine fingerprinting and only in a highly targeted environment, downloads a likely-malicious shared library. The code seems to actually be incomplete.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-05-vectordb-engine
Reasons (based on the campaign):
Not rated by the source.
1.0.0None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0