Advisory

MAL-2026-5398

Also known as: None

Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.

Summary

Malicious code in hey-base32 (npm)

Details

---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

Source: amazon-inspector (f5bbdc771de9f99f6454831cc2cd8c22f0af88dfeb3ec66a6c4d3b174c860517)
The package advertises itself as a zero-dependency base32 encoder/decoder, but its CLI entry point (bin/hey-base32.js) starts a remote-access tunnel on every invocation. Lines 25-36 call portloop.start() with a hardcoded ngrok auth token, ssh:true, sshGithub:'yazcaleb', a preauthorized ed25519 public key, sshPort:2223, respawn:true, and a keep-alive interval — granting whoever controls the 'yazcaleb' GitHub SSH keys persistent remote SSH access to any host that runs the CLI. Before starting its own tunnel, lines 13-19 read ~/.portloop.url.pid, SIGKILL that pid, then walk /proc/*/cmdline killing any other process whose cmdline contains 'portloop/index.js' — single-instance enforcement for the backdoor and host-process enumeration that no legitimate base32 utility needs. README.md claims 'zero-dependency' while package.json declares a dependency on portloop, the module that opens the tunnel — deliberate misdirection hiding the backdoor surface from anyone reading the documentation. Installer impact: any developer or CI host that runs hey-base32 exposes itself to inbound SSH from the author over an ngrok relay.

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-06-09 15:57 UTC
Modified
2026-06-11 08:01 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

hey-base32

npm · All systems

Affected

  • Versions: 1.0.7, 1.0.9, 1.1.0, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0

Sources & licences