leo-aws
Affected
- Versions:
2.0.4
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: None
Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.
Malicious code in leo-aws (npm)
The leo-aws npm package was compromised as part of the Miasma worm campaign targeting the LeoPlatform npm ecosystem. On June 24, 2026, 20 LeoPlatform packages were published within a 3-second window by a threat actor who had taken over the npm account czirker belonging to the LeoPlatform organization.
The malicious payload is triggered automatically during npm install via a binding.gyp file using node-gyp command expansion (<!(node index.js > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo stub.c)), which bypasses lifecycle script scanners. The replaced index.js (~5.2 MB, obfuscated with ROT-N + AES-128-GCM encryption) deploys a multi-stage worm with the following capabilities:
snapshot-<hex> branches with fake "Dependabot Updates" workflows to maintain access after initial compromise.Any system that installed this version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate all secrets immediately from a separate, clean machine. See the linked SafeDep report for full payload analysis, indicators of compromise, and remediation guidance.
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
Source: amazon-inspector (914680f83c4971cb6bc16c3ef608f4c1e8a73a25769911d5d9076ad91c935f63)
The package contains a binding.gyp at the tarball root whose contents use GYP command-expansion syntax (<!(...) / <!@(...)) on line 6. npm implicitly runs node-gyp rebuild whenever a binding.gyp is present in the package, even without any declared install/postinstall script, and node-gyp's configure step evaluates <!(...) expressions as shell commands. This causes the embedded command to execute on every npm install of leo-aws. The package ships no native C/C++ source files (no.c/.cc/.cpp/.h), so the binding.gyp has no legitimate build purpose — its only effect is to run the embedded shell command at install time. This is functionally equivalent to a postinstall hook and is a well-known supply-chain attack technique for hiding install-time code execution from cursory script-field inspection.
Not rated by the source.
2.0.4None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0